




	Empirical	 studies	 of	 the	 social	 lives	 of	 non-human	 primates,	 cetaceans,	 and	 other	social	animals	have	prompted	scientists	and	philosophers	to	debate	the	question	of	whether	 morality	 and	 moral	 cognition	 exists	 in	 non-human	 animals.	 Some	researchers	have	argued	 that	morality	does	exist	 in	 several	animal	 species,	others	that	 these	species	may	possess	various	evolutionary	building	blocks	or	precursors	to	morality,	but	not	quite	the	genuine	article,	while	some	have	argued	that	nothing	remotely	 resembling	morality	 can	 be	 found	 in	 any	 non-human	 species.	 However,	these	different	positions	on	animal	morality	generally	appear	to	be	motivated	more	by	 different	 conceptions	 of	 how	 the	 term	 “morality”	 is	 to	 be	 defined	 than	 on	empirical	 disagreements	 about	 animal	 social	 behaviour	 and	 psychology.	 After	delving	 deeper	 into	 the	 goals	 and	methodologies	 of	 various	 of	 the	 protagonists,	 I	argue	that,	despite	appearances,	there	are	actually	two	importantly	distinct	debates	over	 animal	 morality	 going	 on,	 corresponding	 to	 two	 quite	 different	 ways	 of	thinking	 about	 what	 it	 is	 to	 define	 “morality”,	 “moral	 cognition”,	 and	 associated	notions.	Several	apparent	skirmishes	in	the	literature	are	thus	cases	of	researchers	simply	talking	past	each	other.	I	then	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	debate	over	animal	 morality,	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 understanding	 the	 nature	 and	phylogenetic	 distribution	 of	 morality	 conceived	 as	 a	 psychological	 natural	 kind.	 I	argue	that	this	debate	is	in	fact	largely	terminological	and	non-substantive.	Finally,	I	reflect	on	how	this	core	debate	might	best	be	re-framed.	
	
	
1.	 Introduction	In	 recent	 years,	 there	 has	 been	much	 interest	 in	whether	morality	 exists	 in	 some	non-human	 animals	 (henceforth,	 “animals”),	 or,	 put	 differently,	 whether	 some	animals	 possess	 a	 moral	 psychology:	 whether	 they	 possess	 the	 requisite	psychological	capacities	to	engage	in	some	form	of	moral	cognition	and	action—for	instance,	make	judgments	of	moral	approval	or	disapproval	about	others’	behaviour,	internalize	 and	 enforce	moral	 rules	 or	 norms,	 and	 act	 for	moral	 reasons	 (e.g.,	 act	punitively	 towards	 another	 individual	 because	 of	 a	 moral	 evaluation	 of	 that	individual’s	behaviour).	Such	questions	have	been	prompted	by	a	burgeoning	empirical	literature	on	the	remarkably	complex	and	intricate	social	lives,	particularly	of	our	closest	primate	
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relatives,	 but	 also	 of	 other	 social	mammals	 like	 elephants,	 domestic	 dogs,	wolves,	whales,	dolphins,	and	rats,	and	even	some	non-mammalian	species,	such	as	ravens.	For	 example,	 chimpanzees	 appear	 to	 engage	 in	 third-party	 policing	 of	 behaviour,	which	seems	to	indicate	the	existence	and	enforcement	of	norms	of	conduct	within	their	communities	(de	Waal,	1996,	2014;	Rudolf	von	Rohr,	et	al.,	2012).	Special	place	is	 typically	accorded	 to	 infants,	 for	 instance,	 such	 that	aggression	 towards	 them	 is	met	with	loud	protests	and	active	intervention	on	the	part	of	uninvolved	bystanders	(Rudolf	 von	 Rohr,	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 2015).	Many	 other	 social	mammals	 also	 appear	 to	enforce	 various	 behavioural	 norms.	 For	 instance,	 many	 species	 of	 primate,	 along	with	 dogs,	 wolves,	 and	 dolphins,	 engage	 in	 elaborate	 play	 rituals	 and	 appear	 to	punish	 individuals	 that	 break	 the	 rules	 governing	 such	 interactions,	 such	 as	ostracizing	animals	that	play	too	aggressively	(Flack	and	de	Waal,	2004;	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	 2009).	 There	 has	 also	 been	work	 that	 purports	 to	 indicate	 other-directed	emotional	capacities	like	sympathy	and	empathy	that	have	long	been	thought	to	be	important	 in	human	moral	cognition	and	motivation	(see	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	2009;	Andrews	and	Gruen,	2014	for	reviews).	In	a	famous	study,	rhesus	monkeys	refused	to	press	a	lever	to	receive	food	(even	in	to	the	point	of	near	starvation),	when	they	discovered	that	 this	would	result	 in	another	monkey	receiving	an	electronic	shock	(Wechkin	et	al.,	1964).	Though	this	result	could	be	explained	in	a	variety	ways	(e.g.,	the	monkeys	merely	avoided	doing	something	that	caused	an	aversive	stimulus),	a	not	unreasonable	interpretation	is	that	the	monkeys	recognized	and	wished	to	avoid	causing	distress	in	others,	suggesting	some	degree	of	sympathetic	concern.	Similar	pro-social	 helping	 behaviours	 suggestive	 of	 empathy	 and	 sympathy	 have	 been	documented	in	several	species,	including	rats	(Bartal	et	al.,	2011;	Sato	et	al.,	2015),	and	 chimpanzees,	 who	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 direct	 consoling	 behaviours	 towards	losers	after	fights	(de	Waal,	1996;	Fraser	and	Aureli,	2008)	and	display	physiological	signs	of	emotional	arousal	in	response	to	 images	of	violence	or	other	chimpanzees	displaying	fearful	or	distressed	facial	expressions	(reviewed	by	Rudolf	von	Rohr	et	al.,	2011).		
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In	light	of	such	research,	various	scientists	and	philosophers	have	proposed	accounts	 of	 the	 moral	 capacities	 of	 animals,	 their	 similarities	 and	 differences	 to	those	of	human	beings,	and	of	the	evolution	of	morality	more	generally.		At	most	generous	end	of	the	spectrum	are	researchers	like	Bekoff	and	Pierce	(2009),	 Rowlands	 (2012;	 2017),	Musschenga	 (2013),	 Andrews	 and	Gruen	 (2014),	and	Monsó	(2015),	all	of	whom	argue	that	at	least	a	core	subset	of	the	psychological	capacities	that	underlie	human	morality	are	far	from	uniquely	human,	but	are	rather	things	 that	 we	 share	 with	 many	 social	 animals.	 Whatever	 differences	 may	 exist	between	their	moral	psychologies	and	moral	systems	and	those	of	humans—none	of	these	authors	deny	that	there	are	such	differences—should	be	seen	as	differences	in	the	 extent	 and	 sophistication	 of	 moral	 capacity.	 Researchers	 like	 de	 Waal	 (1996,	2006a;	 Flack	 and	 de	Waal,	 2000)	 are	 rather	 less	 generous,	 however,	 arguing	 that	what	 we	 find	 in	 animals,	 particularly	 other	 primates,	 is	 proto-morality:	 various	psychological	“building	blocks”	or	“evolutionary	precursors”	to	morality,	but	not	the	fully-fledged	 article.	 They	 argue	 that	 while	 there	 is	 important	 evolutionary	continuity	 here,	 a	 crucial	 evolutionary	 change	 occurred	 uniquely	 in	 the	 human	lineage,	giving	rise	 to	genuine	morality	(see	also	 Joyce,	2006;	Kitcher,	2006,	2011;	Rudolf	 von	Rohr	et	 al.,	 2011;	Boehm,	2012;	Haidt,	 2012;	 Suddendorf,	 2013;	Prinz,	2014).	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	researchers	like	Korsgaard	(2006)	and	Ayala	 (2010),	 who	 deny,	 albeit	 for	 different	 reasons,	 that	 anything	 remotely	resembling	morality	or	a	moral	psychology	can	be	found	in	animals.	Even	de	Waal’s	claim	 that	 some	 species	 possess	 “building	 blocks”	 of	 morality	 goes	 too	 far,	amounting	 to	 a	 comparison	 between	 apples	 and	 oranges,	 so	 different	 are	 the	capacities	 of	 non-humans	 from	 what	 is	 required	 to	 possess	 the	 genuine	 article.	These	authors	thus	regard	the	capacity	for	moral	cognition	as	representing	“a	break	with	our	animal	past”	(Korsgaard,	2006,	p104).		 One	 of	 the	 interesting	 things	 about	 this	 debate	 is	 that	 there	 has	 been	relatively	little	disagreement	about	the	empirical	data.	Though	much	of	the	relevant	research	 is	 controversial,	 largely	 for	 methodological	 reasons,	 since	 much	 of	 it	consists	of	anecdotal	reports	of	animal	behaviour,	and	because	there	has	been	some	inconsistency	 between	 the	 results	 of	 field	 and	 lab-based	 studies	 of	 pro-social	
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behaviour	 (see	 de	Waal,	 2006a;	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce,	 2009;	 Rudolf	 von	 Rohr	 et	 al.,	2011;	Tomasello,	2016),	 it	 is	not	 the	data	 itself	 that	has	been	the	primary	focus	of	this	 debate.	 Nor,	 indeed,	 has	 there	 been	 much	 disagreement	 about	 what	 specific	psychological	 capacities	 can	be	 inferred	 from	 this	 data.1	Rather,	 the	disagreement	has	mostly	been	about	the	standard	that	“genuine”	or	“proto”-moral	creatures	must	live	up	to—not	what	psychological	capacities	particular	species	actually	possess,	but	what	capacities	they	must	have	in	order	for	us	to	describe	them	as	having	morality	or	proto-morality.	Indeed,	even	those	who	generally	fall	into	the	same	camp	on	the	question	of	whether	animals	have	morality	or	a	moral	psychology	endorse	different	definitions	of	what	it	is	to	have	such	a	thing,	or	to	possess	“precursors”	or	“building	blocks”	 of	 morality.	 The	 question	 I	 want	 to	 press	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 the	 meta-philosophical	one:	what	counts	as	getting	this	standard	or	definition	right?		 Though,	as	we	will	see,	it	isn't	easy	to	keep	descriptive	and	normative	issues	apart,	 to	 be	 clear,	 the	 debate	 is	 ostensibly	 about	what	 it	 is	 to	 have	morality	 or	 a	moral	psychology	 in	 the	descriptive	 rather	 than	the	normative	 senses	of	 “morality”	and	“moral”.	Normative	definitions	of	these	terms	are	tied	to	some	account	of	what	are	the	correct	or	ideally	rational	moral	beliefs,	attitudes,	actions,	and	so	forth—this	is	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 philosophers	 might	 talk	 about	 the	 “demands”	 or	“requirements”	of	morality.	Purely	descriptive	definitions,	however,	are	meant	to	be	independent	 of	 such	normative	 claims	 about	what	morality	 requires	 (Gert,	 2016).	For	 instance,	 a	 neo-Nazi	 may	 be	 regarded	 as	 having	 a	 “morality”	 or	 a	 “moral	psychology”	 in	 the	 descriptive	 senses	 of	 these	 terms,	 insofar	 as	 she/he	 possesses	psychological	 capacities	 that	 enable	 the	 holding	 of	 various	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes	about	 moral	 issues.	 However,	 a	 neo-Nazi	 might	 not	 be	 regarded	 as	 having	 a	“morality”	 in	 the	 normative	 sense,	 insofar	 as	 we	 may	 want	 to	 regard	 she/he	 as	possessing	false	or	irrational	beliefs/attitudes,	or	as	behaving	in	a	morally	incorrect																																																									1	One	 important	area	of	disagreement	 concerns	 the	 type	of	 empathetic	 capacity	present	 in	various	species.	This	is	linked	with	disagreement	about	the	putative	link	between	the	type	of	empathy	taken	to	be	important	for	morality	and	mind-reading,	and	disagreement	about	the	mind-reading	capacities	of	 animals	 (see	 fn.3	 for	 further	 discussion).	 Some	 researchers	 have	 also	 disputed	 whether	 social	norms	 can	 actually	 exist	 in	 animals	 with	 limited	mind-reading	 and	 social	 learning	 capacities	 (see	Andrews,	2009;	Tomasello,	2016).	
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way.	Failure	to	appreciate	this	distinction	has	 led	to	some	unfortunate	episodes	 in	the	 debate	 over	 animal	 morality.	 For	 instance,	 some	 researchers	 have	 taken	 the	question	of	whether	morality	or	moral	cognition	exists	in	animals	to	amount	to	the	question	 of	 whether	 they	 behave	 in	 ways	 that	 we	 might	 regard	 as	 morally	
praiseworthy	(see,	for	instance,	Jensen	et	al.,	2007	on	whether	chimpanzees	have	a	sense	of	fairness).	However,	as	several	commentators	have	pointed	out	(e.g.,	Joyce,	2006;	de	Waal,	2006b;	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	2009),	whether	or	not	animals	behave	in	ways	 that	we	might	 judge	 to	be	 right	or	good	according	 to	a	particular	normative	standard	 is	 as	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 moral	cognition	or	action	as	 the	repulsiveness	of	National	Socialism	 is	 to	 the	question	of	whether	it	constitutes	a	moral	system	in	the	descriptive	sense	of	“moral”.	Of	course,	the	meta-philosophical	question	posed	above	is	not	unique	to	the	debate	over	animal	morality.	Many	of	the	descriptive	accounts	of	what	it	is	to	have	a	morality	or	moral	psychology	that	have	been	offered	in	this	context	are	inspired	by	various	 of	 the	main	 traditions	 in	moral	 philosophy	 (in	 particular,	 sentimentalism	and	Kantianism),	each	of	which	can	be	regarded	as	offering	different	definitions	of	these	and	other	related	notions—including	what	it	is	to	engage	in	moral	reasoning	or	moral	judgment,	be	a	moral	agent,	and	of	the	primary	concerns	or	subject	matter	of	 morality	 more	 generally.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 an	 under-appreciated	 feature	 of	 moral	philosophy	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 different	 traditions	 assume	 quite	 different	conceptions	 of	 the	 target	 of	moral	 theory.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 bounds	 or	 subject	matter	 of	 morality,	 there	 is	 also	 currently	 a	 vigorous	 debate	 in	 cognitive	 science	concerned	with	 the	 nature	 of	 human	moral	 psychology.	 Haidt	 (2012)	 has	 argued	that	much	of	the	field	has	adopted	what	he	refers	to	as	a	“liberal”	conception	of	the	moral	domain,	focused	on	issues	of	harm	and	fairness,	ignoring	more	“conservative”	concerns,	such	as	purity,	respect,	and	group-loyalty,	meaning	that	many	important	aspects	of	human	moral	psychology	have	largely	gone	unstudied.	Haidt	argues	that	this	is	partly	due	to	the	influence	of	the	work	of	Turiel	and	colleagues	(Turiel,	1983),	who	 have	 offered	 a	 psychological	 account	 of	 the	 putative	 difference	 between	genuine	“moral”	judgments	and	so-called	“conventional”	normative	judgments	(e.g.,	normative	 judgments	 about	 matters	 of	 etiquette	 and	 taste),	 according	 to	 which	
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moral	 judgments	 concern	 issues	of	 harm	and	 fairness	 and	display	 a	 characteristic	psychological	profile	quite	different	to	that	of	conventional	normative	judgments—for	 instance,	 they	are	typically	regarded	as	universal,	authority-independent,	more	serious,	 and	 tend	 to	 be	 justified	 by	 appeal	 to	 notions	 of	 harm,	 rights,	 and	 justice.	This	account	of	the	moral/conventional	distinction	has	come	in	for	much	criticism,	including	 from	 Haidt,	 who	 has	 argued	 that	 it	 illegitimately	 places	 many	“conservative”	concerns	outside	of	the	moral	domain.	In	each	of	these	instances,	the	assumption	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 correct	 account	 of	 the	 relevant	 concepts	 (morality,	
moral	 domain,	moral	 judgment,	 moral	 norm,	 moral	 agency,	 etc.)	 to	 be	 had.	 This	clearly	gives	rise	to	the	question	of	how	we	are	tell	when	we	have	in	fact	locked	on	to	the	correct	account	of	any	of	these	notions.	My	inspiration	for	asking	this	meta-philosophical	question	comes	from	Stich	and	 colleagues	 (Nado	et	 al.,	 2009;	 Stich,	2009),	who	have	pressed	 it	 in	 relation	 to	much	recent	work	in	human	moral	psychology,	particularly	the	Turiel	tradition	and	the	putative	moral/conventional	 distinction.	 They	 regard	Turiel	 and	 colleagues	 as	attempting	to	articulate	moral	judgment	as	a	psychological	natural	kind	(defined	by	the	 characteristic	 subject	matter	 and	 psychological	 profile	 described	 above).	 This	contrasts	 with	 the	 standard	 approach	 of	 philosophers	 towards	 defining	 such	notions,	which	typically	involves	some	form	of	conceptual	analysis.	Ultimately,	Stich	and	 colleagues	 argue	on	 the	basis	 of	 some	empirical	work	 (e.g.,	Kelly	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Fessler	et	al.,	2015)	that	the	Turiel	account	fails	to	pick	out	a	really	existing	natural	kind	and	that	there	is	no	good	reason	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	a	psychologically	distinct	sub-class	of	normative	judgments	that	we	can	regard	as	genuinely	“moral”	as	opposed	to	merely	“conventional”.	After	 describing	 the	 main	 contours	 of	 the	 current	 debate	 over	 animal	morality	 (Section	 2),	 I	 will	 utilize	 Stich	 and	 colleagues’	 distinction	 between	conceptual	 analysis	 and	natural	 kind	 approaches	 to	defining	 “morality”	 and	 argue	that	we	can	find	representatives	of	both	types	of	approach	in	the	current	literature	(Section	 3).	 After	 delving	 deeper	 into	 the	 goals	 and	 methodologies	 of	 these	 two	approaches,	 we	 will	 see	 that,	 despite	 appearances,	 there	 are	 actually	 two	importantly	distinct	debates	over	animal	morality	going	on.	This,	of	course,	implies	
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that	several	of	the	apparent	skirmishes	in	the	current	literature	are	actually	cases	of	researchers	simply	talking	past	each	other.	I	will	then	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	 debate	 that	 has	 been	 going	 on,	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 understanding	 the	nature	 and	 phylogenetic	 distribution	 of	 morality	 conceived	 as	 a	 psychological	natural	kind	(Section	4).	I	will	argue	that	this	debate	is	in	fact	largely	terminological	and	non-substantive.	Finally,	I	will	reflect	on	how	this	core	debate	might	best	be	re-framed	(Section	5).	I	will	argue	in	favour	of	a	more	fine-grained	approach	that	asks	not	whether	 animals	 possess	 a	 “moral”	 or	 “proto-moral”	 psychology,	 but	whether	they	possess	certain	more	tightly	defined	psychological	mechanisms.		
2.	 Moral	animals?	In	their	book,	Wild	Justice,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	define	“morality”	as:		 …a	suite	of	 inter-related	behaviours	that	cultivate	and	regulate	the	complex	interactions	within	social	groups.	These	behaviours	relate	to	well-being	and	harm.	And	norms	of	right	and	wrong	attach	to	many	of	them.	(2009,	p7)			Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 adopt	 the	 view—common	 to	 many	 evolutionary	 theories	 of	morality—that	morality	evolved	 to	 facilitate	and	 improve	 levels	of	co-operation	 in	the	 small-scale	 communities	 that	 our	 ancestors	 lived.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 codes	 of	conduct	 that	 regulate	 individual	 behaviour,	 inhibit	 selfishness,	 discourage	 free	riding,	 reduce	 intra-group	 violence,	 and	 increase	 group	 cohesiveness	 make	 co-operative	endeavours	easier	and	more	effective,	 and	were	 thus	 likely	adaptive	 for	our	 ancestors,	 who	 depended	 on	 co-operation	 with	 others	 for	 survival	 and	successful	 reproduction.	 Similar	 fitness	 benefits	 may	 have	 accrued	 from	 them	having	a	basic	level	of	concern	for	the	interests	of	others	in	their	group.2	However,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	see	no	reason	to	think	that	morality	evolved	only	recently	in	the	human	lineage,	since	the	ancestors	of	many	other	animals	plausibly	also	lived	in	rich	social	ecologies	that	involved	co-operative	endeavours	like	hunting,	defence	against																																																									2	Though	they	do	appear	open	to	the	possibility	of	group	selection	playing	a	role	in	the	evolution	of	some	aspects	of	morality,	as	they	define	it,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	lean	towards	the	view	that	the	evolution	of	mechanisms	 that	 produce	pro-social	 behaviours	 can	be	 explained	without	 necessarily	 having	 to	invoke	selection	at	the	level	of	groups	(see	also,	Joyce,	2006;	de	Waal,	2006a).	
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predators,	 care	 for	 infants,	 grooming,	 play,	 and	 so	 forth,	 and	 thus	 plausibly	 also	needed	the	“social	glue”	that	morality	is	taken	to	provide.	Bekoff	and	Pierce	(2009,	p8)	argue	that	the	empirical	evidence	for	morality	in	animals	comes	in	three	clusters:	the	co-operation	cluster,	which	includes	putative	instances	of	“altruism,	reciprocity,	trust,	punishment	and	revenge”	in	many	species;	the	empathy	cluster,	which	includes	various	other-directed	behaviours	suggestive	of	“sympathy,	 compassion,	 caring,	 helping,	 grieving,	 and	 consoling”;	 and	 the	 justice	cluster,	 which	 includes	 behaviours	 suggestive	 of	 “a	 sense	 of	 fair	 play,	 sharing,	 a	desire	 for	equity,	 expectations	about	what	one	deserves	and	how	one	ought	 to	be	treated,	 indignation,	 retribution,	 and	 spite”.	 Their	 claim	 is	 thus	 that	 many	 social	animals	 possess	 a	 variety	 of	 psychological	 capacities—including	 other-directed	emotional	 capacities	 like	 sympathy	 and	 empathy,3	 pro-social	 and	 altruistic	motivation,	and	a	primitive	sense	of	“right	and	wrong”	tied	to	various	social	norms4																																																									3	 Though	 the	 terms	 “sympathy”	 and	 “empathy”	 are	 sometimes	 used	 interchangeably,	 Bekoff	 and	Pierce	recognize	a	distinction	between	empathy	as	a	type	of	emotional	mimicry	(feeling	what	another	is	feeling)	and	sympathy	as	having	an	emotion	on	behalf	on	another	(feeling	for	the	other)	(see	also	Prinz,	2011).	They	also	 take	empathy	 to	come	 in	various	degrees	of	 complexity,	 ranging	 from	 low-level	 emotional	 contagion,	 where	 an	 emotion	 is	 triggered	 in	 an	 individual	 as	 result	 of	 merely	observing	 a	 behavioural	 cue	 from	 another	 (such	 as	 a	 distressed	 or	 fearful	 facial	 expression),	 to	
cognitive	empathy,	where	 the	 individual	 is	able	 to	 fully	adopt	 the	emotional	perspective	of	another	and	understand	the	reasons	for	it	(e.g.,	understanding	that	another	individual	is	fearful	and	what	has	caused	this).	The	latter	requires	a	rich	mind-reading	capacity,	while	lower	levels	of	empathy	needn’t	require	any	ability	to	represent	others’	mental	states.	Sympathy	is	similarly	taken	to	come	in	varying	degrees	 of	 complexity,	 reflecting	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 put	 themselves	 in	another’s	situation.	Following	 de	 Waal	 (2006a),	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 regard	 cognitive	 empathy	 as	 the	 type	 of	empathy	 most	 relevant	 to	 morality,	 since	 it	 involves	 genuine	 recognition	 and	 understanding	 of	another’s	emotional	state,	and	are	willing	to	attribute	full-blown	cognitive	empathy	to	several	species	(de	Waal	restricts	this	capacity	to	apes).	Others	are	much	more	sceptical	about	cognitive	empathy	in	animals,	 largely	because	of	doubts	about	 their	mind-reading	capacities.	Andrews	and	Gruen	(2014;	see	also	Gruen,	2015)	provide	an	account	of	 empathy	and	 its	putative	 connection	with	morality	 in	apes	that	tries	to	carve	some	space	between	emotional	contagion	and	full	cognitive	empathy.	Monsó	(2015)	argues	that	even	emotional	contagion	can	be	viewed	in	moral	terms;	hence,	the	debate	over	animal	morality	can	be	fully	separated	from	the	debate	over	animal	mind-reading.	4	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 take	 these	 social	 norms	 to	 exist	 in	 the	 form	 of	 implicit	 expectations	 about	appropriate	 and	 inappropriate	 behaviour:	 animals	 respond	 to	 norm	 violating	 behaviour	 with	protests	(e.g.,	“waa”	barks	in	chimpanzees),	or	with	punitive	behaviours	of	their	own	(e.g.,	refusing	to	play	 with	 animals	 that	 have	 played	 too	 roughly),	 but	 needn’t	 have	 any	 conscious	 or	 reflective	understanding	 of	 the	 relevant	 norm	 itself.	 Much	 of	 human	 thinking	 about	 social	 norms	 has	 been	claimed	to	be	 like	this	(e.g.,	Nichols,	2004;	Sripada	and	Stich,	2006;	Haidt,	2012).	 In	many,	perhaps	most,	 cases,	 human	 social	 norms	 are	 unconsciously	 internalized	 early	 in	 development,	 and	 all	 the	individual	 typically	 has	 conscious	 access	 to	 are	 the	 agonistic	 emotional	 states	 (like	 anger)	 that		
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that	exist	within	their	communities—that	make	them	worthy	of	being	regarded	as	moral	 beings,	 insofar	 as	 these	 psychological	 traits	 are	 plausibly	 homologues	 or	analogues	to	those	that	underlie	central	aspects	of	human	morality.5	This	 is	not	to	deny	 that	 human	 morality	 and	 moral	 cognition	 and	 chimp	 or	 wolf	 morality	 and	moral	 cognition	 are	 different	 in	 important	ways.	 For	 instance,	 they	 claim	 that	 the	content	of	morality	 is	 importantly	 “species-relative”,	 so	 the	moral	norms	of	 chimp	communities	are	likely	quite	different	to	those	of	wolf	or	human	communities,	and	that	 different	 species	 may	 have	 more	 sophisticated	 moral	 capacities	 than	 others.	But,	at	a	general	 level,	 the	capacity	 to	possess	morality	 is	something	 that	we	share	with	 many	 other	 mammals,	 including,	 they	 argue,	 “bonobos,	 chimpanzees,	elephants,	 wolves,	 hyenas,	 dolphins,	 whales,	 and	 rats”,	 and	 potentially	 even	 with	some	non-mammalian	social	animals	like	ravens	(2009,	p83).	Bekoff	and	Pierce	build	much	of	their	account	on	the	work	of	de	Waal,	a	key	pioneer	 of	 the	 contemporary	 study	 of	 the	 rich	 emotional	 and	 social	 lives	 of	 non-human	primates.	However,	de	Waal	himself	isn’t	prepared	to	go	as	far	as	Bekoff	and	Pierce.	 Instead,	 de	Waal	 (1996,	 2006a;	 Flack	 and	 de	Waal,	 2000)	 sees	 himself	 as	modernizing	the	position	of	Darwin	in	The	Descent	of	Man:																																																																																																																																																																							accompany	 their	 observing	 norm	 violating	 behaviour	 and	 the	 intrinsic	motivation	 to	 punish	 norm	violators.	5	Though	Bekoff	and	Pierce	tend	to	talk	about	“patterns”	and	“clusters”	of	“moral	behaviours”,	their	focus	 is	 really	 on	 the	 internal	 psychological	 mechanisms	 that	 drive	 these	 behaviours.	 It	 is	 the	possession	of	these	mechanisms	that	make	animals	moral	beings,	on	their	view,	not	the	behaviours	
per	se	 (Musshenga,	2013).	For	 instance,	 they	emphasize	the	 following	“threshold	requirements”	 for	being	a	moral	animal:		 [A]	 level	 of	 complexity	 in	 social	 organization,	 including	 established	norms	of	 behaviour	 to	which	attach	strong	emotional	and	cognitive	cues	about	right	and	wrong;	a	certain	 level	of	neural	complexity	 that	serves	as	a	 foundation	 for	moral	emotions	and	 for	decision	making	based	on	perceptions	about	the	past	and	the	future;	relatively	advanced	cognitive	capacities	(a	good	memory,	for	example);	and	a	high	level	of	behavioural	flexibility	(2009,	p83).		Moreover,	 when	 discussing	 instances	 of	 pro-social	 and	 altruistic	 behaviour,	 they	 emphasize	 that	merely	acting	to	help	another	individual	at	cost	to	oneself	 is	 insufficient	for	the	behaviour	count	as	moral	 behaviour.	 What	 matters	 is	 the	 underlying	motivation—i.e.,	 whether	 the	 behaviour	 is	 the	product	of	a	desire	to	help	that	is	itself	other-regarding.	Hence,	when	they	talk	about	altruism	as	an	instance	of	moral	behaviour,	what	they	mean	is	psychological	altruism,	not	just	so-called	“biological”	altruism,	 which	 is	 defined	 exclusively	 in	 terms	 of	 reproductive	 fitness,	 without	 reference	 to	underlying	motivation.	
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Any	 animal	 whatever,	 endowed	 with	 well-marked	 social	 instincts,	 the	parental	and	filial	affections	being	here	included,	would	inevitably	acquire	a	moral	sense	or	conscience,	as	soon	as	its	mental	powers	had	become	as	well,	or	nearly	as	well	developed,	as	in	man	(Darwin,	1871,	p68-69).		Darwin	was	sympathetic	 to	 the	sentimentalist	 tradition	of	moral	philosophers	 like	David	 Hume	 and	 Adam	 Smith	 that	 rooted	 human	 moral	 cognition	 in	 sentiment,	particularly	 our	 ability	 to	 empathize	 with	 others,	 and	 argued	 that	 our	 moral	sentiments	should	be	seen	as	an	outgrowth	of	the	pro-social	instincts	and	emotional	capacities	of	our	non-human	ancestors,	which	we	share	with	many	other	species.	In	a	 similar	 vein,	 de	 Waal	 points	 to	 what	 he	 regards	 as	 the	 evolutionarily	 ancient	“building	blocks”	of	moral	cognition—sympathy	and	empathy	towards	others,	pro-social	and	altruistic	motivation,	and	what	he	calls	a	primitive	“sense	of	fairness”	tied	to	 social	 norms—which	 we	 share	 with	 other	 primates	 (apes,	 in	 particular).	However,	like	Darwin,	de	Waal	argues	that	there	is	a	key	difference	between	human	morality	 and	 the	 sentiments	 and	 social	 norms	 of	 other	 animals.	 Darwin	 largely	adopted	the	view	of	Hume	and	Smith	 that	 the	possession	of	a	 true	moral	sense	or	“conscience”	required	not	just	capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy,	or	the	capacity	to	 make	 judgments	 about	 others’	 behaviour,	 but	 also	 a	 special	 type	 of	 reflective	capacity.	For	Hume,	this	was	the	ability	to	“perceiv[e]	the	duties	and	obligations	of	morality”	 (Hume,	 1978,	 p468),	 and	 to	 abstract	 away	 from	 one’s	 own	 situation	 to	make	 judgments	 from	 a	 position	 of	 impartiality.	 For	 Darwin,	 it	was	 the	 ability	 to	self-consciously	 reflect	 on	 one’s	 actions	 and	 motives,	 “and	 of	 approving	 or	disapproving	 of	 them”	 (1871,	 p85).	 It	was	 this	 capacity	 for	 critical	 self-reflection,	which	came	with	the	evolution	of	increased	“mental	powers”	in	humans	(Rowlands,	2012).6	De	Waal	doesn’t	explicitly	 locate	 the	difference	 in	 such	a	 capacity	 for	 self-reflection,	but	rather	in	the	scope	and	explicitness	of	human	moral	codes:	
																																																								6	 In	 this	 respect,	 Darwin	 seems	 to	 have	 viewed	 the	 human	 moral	 sense	 as	 a	 by-product	 of	 the	evolution	of	sophisticated	reasoning	capacities,	rather	than	a	specific	psychological	adaptation	in	its	own	 right	 (Ayala,	 2010).	 He	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 development	 of	 human	moral	 norms	 (i.e.,	 the	content	of	specific	moral	belief	systems,	rather	than	the	psychological	mechanisms	that	underlie	the	capacity	to	have	such	systems)	was	shaped	by	a	process	of	cultural	group	selection:			
	 11	
	Instead	 of	 merely	 ameliorating	 relations	 around	 us,	 as	 apes	 do,	 we	 have	explicit	 teachings	 about	 the	 value	 of	 the	 community	 and	 the	 precedence	 it	takes,	or	ought	to	take,	over	individual	interests.	Humans	go	much	further	in	all	of	this	than	the	apes	[…]	which	is	why	we	have	moral	systems	and	they	do	not.	(2006a,	p54)		The	sentiments	and	social	norms	of	non-human	primates	are	too	local	and	specific	to	 interactions	 between	 individuals	 to	 count	 as	 being	 genuinely	moral.	 De	 Waal	argues	 that	 this	widening	 of	 concern	 to	 the	 community	 as	 a	whole,	 giving	 rise	 to	genuine	moral	 belief	 systems	 in	 the	human	 lineage,	was	partly	 the	product	 of	 the	evolution	 of	 warfare.	 As	 communities	 became	 larger	 and	 engaged	 in	 greater	 and	more	deadly	inter-group	conflict,	the	harmony	and	cohesiveness	of	the	community	became	 even	 more	 important,	 leading	 to	 more	 explicit	 and	 more	 general	 rules	governing	 behaviour.	 De	 Waal	 also	 places	 emphasis	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 human	language	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 regimenting	 and	 transmitting	 genuine	 moral	 norms	 and	judgments.	Albeit	with	 some	 important	differences	 in	detail,	 Joyce	 (2006),	Kitcher	(2006,	 2011),	 Rudolf	 von	 Rohr	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 Boehm	 (2012),	 Haidt	 (2012),	 and	Suddendorf	 (2013),	among	others,	have	made	similar	claims	 to	de	Waal	about	 the	continuity	yet	distinctiveness	of	human	morality	and	animal	proto-morality.	In	a	widely	cited	commentary	on	de	Waal’s	claims	about	the	“building	blocks”	of	morality	being	present	in	other	species,	Korsgaard	(2006)	argues	that	true	moral	cognition	requires:		[N]ormative	self-government...	a	certain	form	of	self-consciousness:	namely,	consciousness	 of	 the	 grounds	 on	 which	 you	 act	 as	 grounds...	 you	 have	 a	certain	reflective	distance	from	the	motive,	and	you	are	 in	a	position	to	ask																																																																																																																																																																						It	must	not	be	 forgotten	 that	although	a	high	 standard	of	morality	gives	but	a	 slight	or	no	advantage	 to	 each	man	and	his	 children	over	 the	other	men	of	 the	 same	 tribe,	 yet	 that	 an	advancement	 in	 the	 standard	 of	morality	 and	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	well-endowed	men	will	certainly	give	an	immense	advantage	to	one	tribe	over	another	(1871,	p159).		Modern	 theorists	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 morality	 disagree	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 human	 moral	capacities	 are	 themselves	 psychological	 adaptations	 or	 by-products	 of	 adaptations	 for	 other	functions,	and	about	the	extent	to	which	the	specific	content	of	human	moral	codes	and	 judgments	have	been	shaped	by	genetic	rather	purely	cultural	evolution	(for	a	survey,	see	Machery	and	Mallon,	2010).	
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yourself	"but	should	I	be	moved	in	that	way?	Wanting	that	end	inclines	me	to	do	that	act,	but	does	it	really	give	me	a	reason	to	do	that	act?	(2006,	p113)			This	might	sound	like	Darwin’s	point	about	the	ability	to	reflect	on	one’s	actions	and	motivations	being	distinctive	of	human	moral	psychology.	However,	 in	 contrast	 to	Darwin	and	de	Waal,	Korsgaard	does	not	see	this	core	feature	of	moral	cognition	as	a	part	of	a	continuum	that	includes	the	proto-moral	capacities	of	animals,	but	rather	as	representing	a	fundamental	discontinuity	in	nature.	It	is	thus	a	mistake	to	regard	animals	as	even	proto-moral	beings.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	Korsgaard	adopts	a	largely	Kantian	conception	of	moral	psychology,	centred	not	on	sentiment,	but	upon	a	 capacity	 for	 rational	 deliberation	 about	 the	 normative	 justification	 for	 one’s	actions	and	 judgments	 (“ought	 I	perform	this	action?”;	 “is	 this	 the	 judgment	 that	 I	
should	make	in	this	situation?”).	Though	one	can,	in	a	loose	sense,	regard	de	Waal’s	“building	blocks”	as	precursors	to	human	morality,	in	so	far	as	they	were	in	place	in	our	 ancestors	 before	 they	 became	moral	 beings,	 there	 is	 no	 sense	 in	which	 these	capacities	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 continuous	 with	 the	 reflective	 capacity	 that	constitutes	the	special	ingredient	in	human	moral	psychology:		 [I]t	 is	 the	 proper	 use	 of	 this	 capacity—the	 ability	 to	 form	 and	 act	 on	judgments	of	what	we	ought	to	do—that	the	essence	of	morality	lies,	not	in	altruism	or	the	pursuit	of	the	greater	good.	So	I	do	not	agree	with	de	Waal…	The	difference	here	is	not	a	mere	matter	of	degree.	(Korsgaard,	2006,	p116-7).		 Other	advocates	of	discontinuity	 include	Ayala	 (2010),	who	argues	 that	 the	capacity	 for	 genuine	 moral	 judgment	 and	 agency	 requires	 very	 sophisticated	reasoning	 capacities	 that,	 he	 argues,	 are	 plausibly	 absent	 in	 non-humans.	 These	include:	 i)	 the	 ability	 to	 anticipate	 the	 consequences	 of	 one’s	 actions	 for	 others,	which	 requires	 the	 ability	 “to	 anticipate	 the	 future	 and	 to	 form	mental	 images	 of	realities	 not	 present	 or	 not	 yet	 in	 existence”;7	 ii)	 the	 ability	 “to	 perceive	 certain																																																									7	There	is	strong	evidence	that	many	animals	are	capable	of	anticipating	the	future	and	predicting	the	likely	 outcomes	 of	 their	 actions	 (e.g.,	 Clayton	 and	 Dickinson,	 1998;	 Martin-Ordas	 et	 al.,	 2010).	However,	 Ayala	 seems	 to	 have	 something	 more	 sophisticated	 than	 mere	 causal	 reasoning	 and	anticipation	in	mind—something	more	like	what	 is	often	referred	to	as	“mental	time	travel”,	which		
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objects	or	deeds	as	more	desirable	than	others”,	which	requires	a	capacity	for	highly	abstract	 thought;	 and	 iii)	 the	 ability	 to	make	 reflective	 choices	 between	 different	courses	of	action	(2010,	p9018-9019).	Because	he	regards	each	of	these	capacities	as	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 genuine	 moral	 cognition	 and	 agency,	 Ayala	 thus	 also	denies	any	form	of	“incipient”	morality	in	animals.	Bekoff	and	Pierce	respond	to	those	more	sceptical	about	animal	morality	by	acknowledging	that	there	are	significant	cognitive	differences	between	humans	and	animals.	 For	 instance,	 they	 accept	 de	 Waal’s	 claim	 that	 only	 humans	 are	 able	 to	explicitly	formulate	and	teach	moral	norms	via	language,	and	Korsgaard's	claim	that	animals	 likely	 lack	 the	 rich	meta-cognitive	 capacities	 required	 for	 normative	 self-government.	 However,	 they	 argue	 that	 these	 are	 differences	 within	 the	 moral	domain,	not	between	moral	humans	and	non-moral	(or	proto-moral)	animals:		 We	 view	 each	 of	 these	 possibly	 unique	 capacities	 (language,	 judgment)	 as	outer	layers	of	the	Russian	doll,	relatively	late	evolutionary	additions	to	the	suite	of	moral	behaviours.	And	although	each	of	 these	capacities	may	make	human	morality	 unique,	 they	 are	 all	 grounded	 in	 a	much	 deeper,	 broader,	and	evolutionary	more	ancient	layer	of	moral	behaviours	that	we	share	with	other	animals.	(2009,	p141)			 Similarly,	Andrews	and	Gruen	(2014)	criticize	the	tendency	of	philosophers	like	Korsgaard	to	focus	on	“the	most	rarefied	and	linguistically	mediated”	aspects	of	human	moral	cognition	and	behaviour:		 Once	we	are	able	to	look	past	the	most	salient	examples	of	human	morality,	we	find	that	moral	behaviour	and	thought	is	a	thread	that	runs	through	our	daily	 activities,	 from	 the	 micro-ethics	 involved	 in	 coordinating	 daily	behaviours	 like	 driving	 a	 car	 down	 a	 crowded	 street	 […]	 to	 the	 sharing	 of	someone’s	 joy	 in	getting	a	new	job	or	a	paper	published.	 If	we	 ignore	these	sorts	 of	moral	 actions,	we	 are	 overintellectualizing	 human	morality	 (2014,	p194).																																																																																																																																																																						involves	the	ability	to	mentally	project	oneself	backward	or	forward	in	time,	and	is	widely	held	to	be	uniquely	human,	largely	because	it	is	thought	to	require	a	particularly	rich	form	of	self-consciousness	(e.g.,	 Suddendorf,	 2013;	 though	 see	Clayton	and	Dickson,	2010).	The	 type	of	mental	 time	 travel	he	regards	to	be	most	 important	 for	morality	also	 involves	being	able	to	project	oneself	 into	someone	else’s	situation	in	time—for	instance,	being	able	to	anticipate	what	their	emotional	state	would	be.	
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	Such	a	less	intellectualized	conception	of	what	it	is	to	think	and	behave	morally—for	instance,	Gruen’s	(2015)	own	“entangled	empathy”	account,	which	requires	just	that	one	has	some	understanding	of	another’s	situation	and	needs,	and	how	to	respond	to	 their	 situation—is	much	 friendlier	 to	 including	 the	capacities	 for	sympathy	and	empathy	and	 the	 tight	 social	 bonds	and	 relationships	of	 apes,	 in	particular,	 inside	the	moral	domain.8		 Another	important	contribution	to	this	debate	comes	from	Rowlands	(2012).	He	criticizes	Bekoff	and	Pierce	for	offering	too	expansive	a	definition	of	what	it	is	to	have	 a	 moral	 psychology,	 including	 the	 capacities	 underlying	 various	 helping	behaviours	 and	 social	 norms,	which	 need	 not,	 he	 argues,	 be	 seen	 in	moral	 terms.	Indeed,	 he	 suggests	 that	 they	 have	 essentially	 defined	 “morality”	 so	 broadly	 as	 to	make	 the	question	of	whether	animals	 can	be	moral	beings	uninteresting.	 Instead,	Rowlands	argues	that	the	real	question	is	whether	animals	are	capable	of	acting	for	moral	 reasons.	 He	 adopts	 a	 largely	 sentimentalist	 account	 of	 moral	 motivation,	according	to	which	one	can	act	morally	if	one	is	moved	by	certain	emotional	states,	such	as	compassion	at	the	plight	of	an	other,	which	may	incline	one	to	act	so	as	to	alleviate	their	suffering,	or	 indignation	at	another’s	actions,	which	may	incline	one	to	 behave	 punitively	 towards	 them.9	 He	 adopts	 an	 externalist	 theory	 of	 moral	content,	according	to	which	particular	emotional	states	represent	moral	properties	if	 they	 bear	 appropriate	 causal	 relations	 to	 them.	 Crucially,	 Rowlands	 argues,	 a	creature	need	not	be	aware	of	these	relations	in	order	for	these	emotional	states	to	have	moral	content	and	constitute	moral	reasons	for	action.	Against	 those	 Kantians,	 Aristotelians,	 and	 sentimentalists	 (Rowlands	includes	Hume	and	Darwin	here)	that	have	claimed	that	genuine	moral	motivation																																																									8	 Andrews	 and	 Gruen	 (2014)	 argue	 that	 this	 recognition	 and	 concern	 for	 others	 needn’t	 require	particularly	 rich	mind-reading	 capacity.	 Hence,	 cognitive	 empathy	 needn’t	 be	 necessary	 for	moral	empathy.	9	Rowlands	does	not	 regard	 this	 as	 the	only	 route	 to	moral	 action.	Hence,	 he	departs	 from	a	 strict	sentimentalism	by	 allowing	 for	 the	possibility	 of	moral	 action	being	produced	by	 “cold”	 reasoning	processes,	 without	 affective	 states	 having	 to	 play	 a	 necessary	 role.	 However,	 he	 thinks	 that	 such	cognitive	forms	of	moral	motivation	are	probably	unique	to	humans.	
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requires	that	one	at	least	sometimes	be	consciously	aware	of	one’s	reasons	and	be	able	to	reflect	on	their	normative	 force,	Rowlands	points	to	the	case	of	Myshkin,	a	character	 based	 on	 the	 prince	 from	Dostoyevsky’s	The	 Idiot.	Myshkin	 experiences	what	seems	like	compassion	for	others	and	is	thus	compelled	to	act	in	ways	that	we	would	ordinarily	regard	as	kind	or	compassionate,	yet	lacks	the	capacity	to	subject	these	feelings	and	actions	to	critical	scrutiny.	He	is	unable	to	consciously	recognize	these	emotional	states	as	reasons	for	action	and	unable	to	think	about	whether	they	are	 the	 correct	 ones	 to	 have	 in	 the	 circumstances.	 Since	 he	 lacks	 these	 capacities,	Rowlands	argues	that	Myshkin	cannot	be	morally	evaluated	(praised	or	blamed)	or	held	morally	responsible	for	his	actions,	and	thus	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	fully-fledged	moral	agent.	However,	it	is	plausible	to	regard	him	as	a	moral	subject,	since	he	is	surely	motivated	by	emotions	that	track	moral	considerations—his	feelings	of	compassion	are	caused	by	others’	suffering,	and	he	clearly	acts	in	order	to	alleviate	this	 suffering.	 Thus,	 Rowlands	 argues	 that	 Myshkin	 possesses	 a	 genuine	 moral	psychology,	but	one	that	operates	on	a	more	“visceral”	level	than	that	of	full	moral	agents.	Even	if	he	lacks	the	reflective	capacity	for	full	moral	agency,	he	can	still	act	for	 moral	 reasons.	 In	 so	 doing,	 Rowlands	 tries	 to	 diffuse	 various	 traditional	philosophical	 arguments	 for	 denying	 that	Myshkin’s	motivations	 can	be	 genuinely	
moral.	The	result	is	that	social	animals	that	also	lack	these	reflective	capacities,	but,	like	 Myshkin,	 are	 capable	 of	 possessing	 other-directed	 emotional	 states	 (like	sympathetic	distress)	that	track	moral	considerations	and	play	a	causal	role	in	their	behaviour,	 may	 also	 be	 regarded	 as	 moral	 subjects.10	 Of	 course,	 the	 question	 of	which	species	actually	satisfy	 these	conditions	 for	moral	subjecthood	 is,	Rowlands	emphasises,	 an	 empirical	 one,	 but	 he	 sees	 the	 work	 on	 animal	 emotion	 cited	 by	Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 and	 de	 Waal	 as	 providing	 at	 least	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 for	 the	existence	of	non-human	moral	subjects.11																																																									10	 Monsó	 (2015)	 points	 out	 that	 Rowlands’	 externalist	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 track	 moral	considerations	allows	that	animals	that	lack	the	capacity	for	full	cognitive	empathy	may	still	possess,	and	be	motivated	by,	moral	emotions.	Even	emotions	produced	by	emotional	contagion	can	count	as	moral.	11	 For	 their	 part,	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 (2009,	 p144-145)	 express	 scepticism	 about	 the	 traditional	philosophical	concept	of	moral	agency	and	argue	that	its	application	to	animals	is	“likely	to	promote		
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3.	 Two	debates	The	 debate	 over	 animal	 morality	 has	 featured	 relatively	 little	 empirical	disagreement	about	what	animals	and	humans	are	able	to	do	or	not	do,	to	the	extent	that	one	can,	as	I	have,	 lay	out	the	contours	of	 the	debate	while	saying	 little	about	the	empirical	data	itself.	Rather,	the	dispute	has	mostly	been	about	where	to	draw	the	 boundary	 of	 morality	 and	 moral	 cognition.	 However,	 though	 there	 has	 been	much	debate	about	different	definitions	of	what	it	is	to	possess	morality	or	a	moral	psychology,	 there	 has	 been	 next	 to	 no	 explicit	 discussion	 of	 what	 standard	 of	correctness	 should	 be	 used	 for	 evaluating	 these	 rival	 definitions.	 Yet,	 the	 debate	appears	 to	 make	 no	 sense	 unless	 we	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 such	 a	 standard.	 The	protagonists	clearly	do	not	see	themselves	as	merely	offering	stipulative	accounts	of	morality*	 or	 morality†.	 The	 debate	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 substantive	 and	 not	 purely	terminological.		 One	difficulty	is	that	theorists	can	and	have	offered	definitions	of	“morality”	and	“moral”	at	all	sorts	of	different	levels:	in	terms	of	behaviour,	in	terms	of	content	(e.g.,	 the	 characteristic	 subject	matter	 of	moral	 norms	 or	 judgments),	 in	 terms	 of	form	or	character	(e.g.,	the	logical	or	psychological	structure	of	moral	judgments	or	moral	norms),	in	terms	of	underlying	processes	or	capacities	(e.g.,	the	possession	of	certain	 types	 of	 emotion	 or	 reasoning	 processes),	 and	 so	 forth.	 But,	 setting	 that	complication	 aside	 for	 the	moment,	 what,	 in	 general,	 is	 it	 to	 define	 “morality”	 or	“moral”?	As	we	will	see,	consideration	of	this	question	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	there	are	actually	 two	quite	different	debates	over	animal	morality,	which	need	to	be	carefully	distinguished.		
3.1	 Conceptual	analysis	vs.	natural	kind	approaches	to	defining	“morality”	
																																																																																																																																																																					philosophical	 confusion	 and	 should	 ultimately	 be	 avoided”.	 However,	 they	 do	 suggest	 that	 animal	behaviour	 can	 be	 morally	 evaluated	 within	 the	 context	 of	 animal	 communities,	 such	 that	 the	behaviour	of	a	wolf	 towards	a	 fellow	wolf	 is	morally	evaluable,	but	 “predatory	behaviour	of	a	wolf	towards	an	elk	is	amoral”.	
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Taking	their	cue	from	Taylor	(1978),	Stich	and	colleagues	(Nado	et	al.,	2009;	Stich,	2009)	distinguish	between	 two	different	 types	of	 approach	 to	defining	 “morality”,	which	employ	different	criteria	for	what	it	 is	to	get	the	definition	right:	conceptual	
analysis	and	natural	kind	approaches.12	Though	conceptual	analysis	can	take	many	forms,	Stich	and	colleagues	focus	on	a	common	version	that	is	employed	in	many	areas	of	contemporary	philosophy.	One	begins	with	a	common	sense	understanding	of	the	concept	to	be	analysed—for	instance,	the	concept,	moral	judgment.	This	might,	for	instance,	be	based	on	certain	commonly	 recognized	 instances	 or	 distinctions	 (e.g.,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	between	 judgments	 about	 canonical	moral	 issues	 and	 judgments	 about	matters	of	taste	 or	 etiquette).	 A	 philosophical	 analysis	 of	 the	 concept	 is	 then	 proposed,	typically	involving	a	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	application	of	the	concept.	 This	 analysis	 is	 then	 tested	 against	 intuitions	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 the	concept	does	actually	apply	 in	various	actual	or	hypothetical	cases.	The	analysis	 is	taken	 to	 stand	 or	 fall	 depending	 on	 how	well	 it	matches	 up	with	 these	 intuitions	over	a	wide	range	of	cases.13	While	empirical	data	may	be	relevant	to	the	conceptual	analysis	approach,	in	so	far	as	it	elicits	intuitions	about	the	application	of	the	concept	under	analysis	and	can	 thus	 be	 used	 to	 test	 the	 adequacy	 of	 proposed	 analyses,	 the	 natural	 kind	approach	 is,	according	to	Stich	and	colleagues,	much	more	of	an	empirical	project.	Natural	kinds	are	real	categories	of	thing	that	exist	in	nature,	independently	of	our	beliefs	 about	 them,	 and	 which	 can	 support	 inductive	 generalizations	 (Bird	 and	Tobin,	 2015).	 Here,	 one	 may	 begin	 with	 an	 intuitive	 or	 theoretically	 motivated	conception	of	what,	say,	a	moral	judgment	is.	Like	the	conceptual	analysis	approach,																																																									12	Stich	and	colleagues	also	talk	about	a	third	type	of	approach:	Oxford-style	linguistic	analysis.	This	would	involve	studying	how	people	use	moral	terms	in	ordinary	language.	I	won't	discuss	that	sort	of	approach	here,	 since	 I	 don't	 think	 that	 any	of	 the	protagonists	 to	 the	debate	 over	 animal	morality	would	see	themselves	as	engaging	in	such	a	project.	13	 The	 introduction	 to	Wallace	 and	Walker	 (1970;	 cited	 by	 Stich	 and	 colleagues)	 provides	 a	 nice	summary	of	 various	 conceptual	 analyses	 of	moral	 rule	 that	 can	be	 extracted	 from	 the	 literature	 in	moral	philosophy	and	the	problems	that	they	face.	Stich	is	a	longstanding	critic	of	conceptual	analysis	in	 philosophy,	 and	 thus	 Stich	 (2009)	 expresses	 much	 scepticism	 about	 this	 approach	 to	 defining	“morality”.	
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this	might	involve	pointing	to	some	intuitively	clear	instances	and	non-instances	of	the	kind.	However,	one	then	conducts	empirical	investigation	into	the	properties	of	the	 clear	 instances,	 seeking	 to	 articulate	 certain	essential	 or	 typically	 co-occurring	properties	that	individuate	the	kind,	and	which	can	then	play	a	role	in	explaining	the	various	generalizations	that	can	be	made	about	its	instances.	Crucially,	this	may	lead	one	 to	 revise	 the	 starting	 conception	 in	 various	ways—for	 instance,	 deciding	 that	what	 one	might	 have	 previously	 regarded	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 the	 kind	 is	 really	 not	(e.g.,	in	the	case	of	the	natural	kind,	water,	an	articulation	of	the	kind	in	terms	of	an	essential	property—possession	of	the	chemical	structure,	H2O—implies	that	certain	clear,	 odourless	 liquids	are	not	 really	 instances	of	water),	 or	deciding	 that	 certain	putative	 essential	 properties	 are	 not	 really	 essential	 to	 the	 kind	 (e.g.,	 modern	biology	 forces	 us	 to	 abandon	 the	 vitalist	 claim	 that	 living	 organisms	 are	distinguished	 from	 non-living	 things	 by	 the	 possession	 of	 some	 intrinsic	 non-physical	 property).	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 standard	 of	 correctness	 is	 empirical:	 how	well	 does	 the	 proposed	 articulation	 of	 the	 kind	 match	 up	 with	 what	 we	 find	 in	nature?	Moreover,	 it	 is	 nature	 that	 ultimately	 has	 the	 last	 say	 about	whether	 the	putative	 kind	 is	 an	 actually	 existing	 natural	 kind	 at	 all	 (consider	 phlogiston	 and	
caloric),	and	the	properties	that	something	must	possess	in	order	to	be	an	instance	of	the	kind.	Stich	 and	 colleagues	 view	 the	 Turiel	 account	 of	 the	 moral/conventional	distinction	as	an	example	of	this	latter	approach	(see	also	Kumar,	2015).	Turiel	and	colleagues	 have	 marshalled	 an	 impressive	 amount	 of	 cross-cultural	 and	developmental	evidence,	which	is	claimed	to	show	that	neuro-typical	humans	(both	pan-culturally	and	at	a	fairly	early	age)	respond	to	violations	of	prototypical	moral	norms	 quite	 differently	 to	 violations	 of	 prototypical	 conventional	 norms.	 This	characteristic	 psychological	 profile	 (universality,	 authority-independence,	 greater	seriousness)	is	also	claimed	to	go	along	with	a	characteristic	subject	matter—issues	of	harm	and	fairness—which	play	a	distinctive	role	in	the	justifications	that	people	tend	 to	offer	 for	 their	 judgments.	These	psychological	properties	 can	 therefore	be	read,	 Stich	 and	 colleagues	 suggest,	 as	 supposedly	 constituting	 a	 nomological	
cluster—a	 set	 of	 typically	 co-occurring	 properties	 that	 are	meant	 to	 individuate	 a	
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distinct	psychological	kind:	moral	 judgment.14	Hence,	 though	Turiel	and	colleagues	were	 initially	 inspired	 by	 the	 philosophical	 literature	 on	 moral	 judgment,	 rather	than	attempting	 to	 specify	 the	 content	of	 the	concept	 of	moral	 judgment,	 they	 are	best	 interpreted	as	doing	 something	more	akin	 to	what	physicists	 sought	 to	do	 in	providing	an	empirical	account	of	 the	nature	of	heat.	Crucially,	 as	 is	 the	case	with	heat,	the	ultimate	outcome	of	such	an	approach	may	bear	little	relationship	to	prior	folk	 concepts	 or	 armchair	 philosophical	 analyses.	 For	 instance,	 on	 Turiel	 and	colleagues’	account,	a	judgment	that	has	the	psychological	profile	of	a	conventional	judgment	 wouldn’t	 count	 as	 a	 moral	 judgment,	 irrespective	 of	 what	 intuition	 or	one’s	favoured	philosophical	account	of	moral	judgment	might	say.	As	we	will	see,	what	I	want	to	call	the	conceptual	approach	to	animal	morality	is	rather	more	complex	than	the	picture	that	Stich	and	colleagues	paint	of	traditional	conceptual	analysis	 in	philosophy—in	particular,	 the	methodology	 isn't	 just	one	of	testing	 proposed	 analyses	 against	 intuitions	 about	 the	 application	 of	 the	 relevant	concept.	Nonetheless,	 Stich	 and	 colleagues’	 distinction	does	help	us	 to	 isolate	 two	quite	different	approaches	to	the	question	of	whether	morality	exists	in	animals.		
3.2	 Conceptual	vs.	natural	kind	approaches	to	animal	morality	Though	 it	 is	 also	possible	 to	 read	his	 account	of	moral	motivation	as	describing	a	natural	 kind	 (see	 Section	4),	Rowlands	 is	 quite	 explicit	 that	he	 sees	his	project	 as	one	of	“conceptual	analysis	and	clarification”	(2012,	p33),	and	though	there	is	more	to	his	case	than	 just	an	appeal	 to	 intuition,	much	of	his	discussion	of	Myshkin	and	
																																																								14	Stich	and	colleagues	suggest	that,	 if	Turiel	and	colleagues	are	right,	 then	moral	 judgments	would	constitute	 something	 like	 a	 homeostatic	 property	 cluster	 (HPC)	 kind	 (Boyd,	 1999).	 HPC	 kinds	 are	individuated	by	clusters	of	typically	co-occurring	properties,	where	this	clustering	can	be	explained	in	 terms	of	a	 shared	underlying	casual	 (homeostatic)	mechanism.	 In	 this	 instance,	 the	homeostatic	mechanism	 would	 presumably	 be	 the	 particular	 psychological	 processes	 that	 underlie	 moral	 as	opposed	 to	 conventional	 judgments.	 Crucially,	 unlike	 on	 classical	 essentialist	 accounts	 of	 natural	kinds,	members	of	HPC	kinds	needn’t	share	sets	of	properties	that	are	both	necessary	and	sufficient	for	kind	membership,	which	is	why	the	HPC	account	has	become	popular	as	an	account	of	biological	and	psychological	kinds,	which	tend	to	exhibit	significant	internal	variability,	but	nonetheless	display	stable	clusterings	of	properties—in	virtue,	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	biological	species,	of	a	shared	evolutionary	history.	
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the	 distinction	 between	 moral	 subjects	 and	 moral	 agents	 clearly	 fits	 with	 the	traditional	methodology	of	conceptual	analysis	that	Stich	and	colleagues	describe.	Rowlands’	main	claim	is	that	there	is	a	distinction	to	be	drawn	between	the	concepts	 of	 moral	 motivation	 and	 moral	 responsibility	 (or	 evaluability).	 His	preliminary	 argument	 for	 this	 distinction	 is	 that	 analyses	 that	 equate	 the	 two	 via	some	form	of	reflection	condition	don’t	match	up	with	what	intuition	seems	to	tell	us	about	Myshkin.	 Intuitively,	Myshkin	does	act	for	moral	reasons,	even	though	he	lacks	 the	 capacity	 for	 critical	 moral	 reflection	 on	 his	 motivations	 and	 actions.	However,	because	he	lacks	this	reflective	capacity,	intuitively,	Myshkin	ought	not	be	regarded	as	worthy	of	praise	or	blame.	Hence,	we	have	a	reason	to	at	least	entertain	the	possibility	of	a	distinction	between	moral	subjects	(who	act	 for	moral	reasons,	but	 need	 not	 be	 morally	 responsible)	 and	 full-blown	 moral	 agents	 (who	 act	 for	moral	 reasons	 and	 are	 morally	 responsible/evaluable	 for	 their	 actions).15	 This	opens	 the	 door	 for	 animals	 without	 rich	 reflective	 to	 potentially	 act	 for	 moral	reasons.	I	want	to	stress	that	this	isn't	the	only	argument	that	Rowlands	gives	for	the	claim	 that	 creatures	 without	 rich	 reflective	 capacities	 can	 act	 for	 moral	 reasons.	However,	 at	 least	 at	 the	 outset,	much	 hangs	 on	 our	 intuitions	 about	whether	 the	concepts	of	moral	motivation	and	moral	responsibility	apply	to	Myshkin.	In	so	far	as	intuition	suggests	that	the	former	but	not	the	latter	apply,	that	provides	preliminary	support	 for	 Rowlands’	 externalist	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 act	 for	 moral	 reasons.	Most	of	the	rest	of	the	book	is	concerned	with	developing	this	analysis	and	rebutting	various	 Kantian	 and	 Aristotelian	 arguments	 for	 resisting	 the	 intuition	 that	Myshkin’s	 motivations	 are	 genuinely	 moral.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 Myshkin	 case	 also	assumes	 that	 sceptics	 about	 animal	 morality,	 like	 Korsgaard,	 are	 engaged	 in	 the	same	 project,	 and	 Rowlands	 (2017)	 suggests	 such	 sceptics	 are	 often	 inclined	towards	 invoking	 reflection	conditions	 in	analyses	of	moral	motivation	because	of																																																									15	Rowlands	(2017)	makes	the	same	sort	of	argument	in	the	case	of	the	notorious	real	life	10-year-old	killers	of	Jamie	Bulger.	Intuition	suggests	that	10-year	olds	lack	full	moral	responsibility,	but	also	that	these	boys	were	motivated	by	(bad)	moral	reasons—for	instance,	they	reported	planning	on	killing	a	child	that	day.		
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the	 intuition	 that	 non-human	 animals	 cannot	 be	moral	 beings—for	 instance,	 that	they	 are	 simply	 prisoners	 of	 their	 desires	 and	 that	 such	 creatures	 cannot	 act	 for	truly	moral	 reasons.	The	Myshkin	case	and	 the	arguments	he	builds	around	 it	 are	thus	 designed	 to	 trump	 that	 intuition	 and	 undermine	 Korsgaard’s	 claim	 that	normative	 self-government	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 creature	 to	 be	 able	 to	 act	 for	 truly	moral	 reasons.	 In	addition,	Rowlands’	 criticism	of	Bekoff	and	Pierce	also	seems	 to	presuppose	 this	 type	 of	 approach.	 His	 claim	 is	 essentially	 that	 their	 expansive	definition	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	moral	 creature	misses	 the	 core	 component	 of	 the	concept—acting	 for	 moral	 reasons.	 He	 takes	 this	 to	 be	 demonstrated	 by	 various	examples	 of	 behaviour	 sufficient	 for	 a	 creature	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 moral	 being	under	 their	 account,	 but	 which	 are	 not	 intuitively	 moral	 behaviours	 at	 all	 (see	Rowlands,	2012,	p25-32).	However,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	do	not	actually	seem	to	be	engaged	in	that	type	of	classic	philosophical	project.	They	don't	seem	to	be	interested	in	our	concepts	of	moral	 motivation	 or	 moral	 agency.	 Rather,	 they	 explicitly	 regard	 morality	 as	 a	
biological	phenomenon,	and	seem	to	reject	the	idea	that	it	is	something	that	can	be	defined	at	a	conceptual	level.16	Hence,	the	definition	they	offer	of	“morality”	isn't,	I	suggest,	meant	to	be	an	articulation	of	the	concept	of	morality.	Rather,	it	is	meant	to	pick	out	a	natural	kind.	Like	Turiel	and	colleagues	on	moral	 judgment,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	 seem	 to	 see	 content	 as	 important,	 claiming	 that	moral	 behaviours	 concern	“harm	 and	 well-being”.	 However,	 their	 principal	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 evolutionary	
function	 of	 morality.	 They	 take	 morality	 qua	 natural	 kind	 to	 be	 a	 cluster	 of	psychological	capacities	 (and	associated	behaviours)	 that	can	be	grouped	together	according	to	a	common	proper	function,	which	is	to	facilitate	and	increase	levels	of	co-operation	 within	 groups	 of	 social	 animals.	 At	 least	 in	 its	 broad	 outlines,	 this	evolutionary-functional	 account	 is	 common	 to	 many	 theories	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	
																																																								16	I	don't	mean	to	imply	that	Rowlands	thinks	that	the	capacities	that	underlie	what	it	is	to	be	a	moral	being	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 biological	 terms.	 He	 does	 hold	 these	 capacities	 to	 be	 a	 product	 of	evolution	 by	 natural	 selection.	 Korsgaard	 appears	 similarly	 open	 to	 evolutionary	 explanations	 for	normative	self-government.	The	issue	is	about	how	we	are	to	determine	which	evolved	capacities	are	
moral	capacities.	
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morality	 (e.g.,	 Sober	 and	 Wilson,	 1997;	 Joyce,	 2006;	 Kitcher,	 2011;	 Haidt,	 2012;	Greene,	2013),	which	see	it,	in	one	way	or	another,	as	a	psychological	adaptation	for	group	living.	The	difference	is	that	Bekoff	and	Pierce	are	more	expansive	in	terms	of	what	capacities	they	claim	to	share	this	common	evolutionary	function,	and	are	thus	more	 liberal	about	what	types	of	psychology	a	creature	can	possess	 in	order	to	be	classified	as	having	a	moral	psychology.17	In	 his	 arguments	 against	 what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 veneer	 theory,	 which	regards	morality	as	an	artificial	overlay	on	our	biological	nature,	de	Waal	 (2006a)	also	 regards	morality	 as	 a	 biological	 phenomenon	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 functional	terms.	 He	 adopts	much	 the	 same	 position	 as	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	when	 it	 comes	 to	grouping	 together	 capacities	 that	he	 regards	 to	be	 “building-blocks”	 of	morality—other-directed	 emotions,	 pro-social	 and	 altruistic	 motivation,	 primitive	 social	norms.	Each	of	these	represent	psychological	adaptations	to	the	demands	of	social	life,	 sharing	 broadly	 the	 same	 function	 of	 improving	 levels	 of	 co-operation	 and	group	cohesiveness.	However,	de	Waal	restricts	the	natural	kind,	morality,	to	human	beings	by	including	only	those	capacities	that	allow	the	scope	of	social	norms	to	be	widened	to	the	community	as	a	whole	and	for	them	to	be	externalized	in	language,	the	 idea	 being	 that	 these	 facilitate	 even	 better	 levels	 of	 co-operation	 and	 group	cohesiveness	 than	 one	 finds	 in	 other	 primates.	 He	 thus	 regards	 morality	 to	 be	 a	specific	 adaptation	 to	 greater	 co-operative	 demands	 placed	 on	 our	 hominin	ancestors.	The	result	is	that	we	have	two	related	but	distinct	natural	psychological	kinds:	 the	 cluster	 of	 proto-moral	 capacities	 shared	 with	 other	 primates	 (and	potentially	other	social	mammals),	which	constitute	(in	Bekoff	and	Pierce’s	words)	a	social	glue,	and	the	cluster	of	moral	capacities	unique	to	humans,	which	constitute	a	
better	social	glue.	
																																																								17	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	appeal	to	function	requires	a	different	conception	of	natural	kinds	to	the	HPC	 account	 that	 Stich	 and	 colleagues	 appeal	 to	 when	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 claims	 of	 Turiel	 and	colleagues,	 since	 that	 account	 has	 difficultly	 in	 accommodating	 function	 (rather	 than	 clustering	 of	properties	 in	 virtue	 of	 an	 underlying	 causal	 mechanism)	 as	 a	 criterion	 for	 kind	 membership	(Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015).	Other	theories	of	natural	kinds	are	friendlier	to	such	functional	kinds	(e.g.,	Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015;	Slater,	2015).	
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It	seems,	then,	that	Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	are	actually	engaged	in	quite	a	different	 debate	 to	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 and	 de	Waal.	 The	 former	 are	 engaged	 in	 a	disagreement	 over	 whether	 particular	 moral	 concepts	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 the	psychological	states	and	behaviours	of	various	animals.	The	issue	is	about	correctly	categorizing	animal	behaviour	and	psychology	either	as	falling	inside	or	outside	the	moral	 domain,	 but	 drawing	 the	 boundaries	 of	 this	 domain	 is	 a	 matter	 of	investigating	 the	 content	 of	 these	 concepts.	 The	 latter	 group	 of	 researchers,	however—and	here,	I	think,	we	can	also	include	most	of	the	other	authors	cited	in	Section	2—seem	to	be	pursuing	quite	a	different	project:	understanding	the	nature	and	 distribution	 of	morality	 as	 a	 biological	 phenomenon—a	psychological	natural	
kind.	 This	 is	 an	 empirical	 rather	 than	 conceptual	 project,	 and	 may,	 like	investigations	into	other	natural	kinds,	lead	to	definitions	of	“morality”	that	depart	significantly	 from	 the	 content	 of	 pre-existing	 folk	 concepts	 or	 philosophical	analyses.	As	Bekoff	and	Pierce	put	it:		We	want	to	detach	the	word	morality	from	some	of	its	moorings,	allowing	us	to	rethink	what	it	is	in	light	of	a	huge	pile	of	research	from	various	fields	that	speaks	to	the	phenomenon.	(2009,	p12).		In	this	respect,	the	two	groups	have	largely	been	talking	past	each	other.	For	instance,	when	Korsgaard	says	that	de	Waal’s	“building	blocks”	have	little	to	do	with	morality	 because	 the	 “essence	 of	 morality”	 is	 normative	 self-government,	 “not	altruism	or	 the	pursuit	of	 the	greater	good”	(2006,	p116),	 she	 is	making	what	she	takes	to	be	a	conceptual	point—it	is	basically	a	category	mistake	to	regard	instances	of	 altruism	 or	 sympathetic	 concern	 as	 having	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 morality.	However,	the	capacities	de	Waal	cites	aren't	meant	to	be	building	blocks	of	human	morality	 in	 a	 conceptual	 sense,	 but	 in	 an	 evolutionary	 one,	 and	 they	 are	 to	 be	regarded	as	continuous	with	 the	capacities	 that	underlie	human	moral	psychology	because	of	their	functional,	not	conceptual,	similarity.	In	response	to	Korsgaard,	de	Waal	says	something	that	is	quite	illuminating	in	this	context:		
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To	 neglect	 the	 common	 ground	 with	 other	 primates,	 and	 to	 deny	 the	evolutionary	roots	of	human	morality,	would	be	like	arriving	at	the	top	of	a	tower	to	declare	that	the	rest	of	the	building	is	 irrelevant,	that	the	precious	concept	 of	 “tower”	 ought	 to	 be	 reserved	 for	 its	 summit.	While	making	 for	good	 academic	 fights,	 semantics	 are	 mostly	 a	 waste	 of	 time.	 Are	 animals	moral?	Let	us	simply	conclude	that	they	occupy	several	floors	of	the	tower	of	morality.	 Rejection	 of	 even	 this	 modest	 proposal	 can	 only	 result	 in	 an	impoverished	view	of	the	structure	as	a	whole.	(2006b,	p181).		Here,	de	Waal	seems	to	recognize	that	Korsgaard's	project	 is	more	of	a	conceptual	one	than	his,	which	is	to	understand	the	evolutionary	roots	of	morality	conceived	as	a	natural	kind.	Yet,	his	 response	 to	her	simply	misses	 the	point:	 for	Korsgaard,	de	Waal’s	 “tower	of	morality”	 isn't	 a	 tower	of	morality	 at	 all,	 and	 to	 regard	 the	other	floors	below	the	summit	as	having	anything	to	do	with	morality	in	her	sense	of	the	term	 is	 to	change	 the	subject.	Rowlands	makes	a	similar	observation	about	Bekoff	and	Pierce’s	(2009,	p140-1)	earlier	quoted	“Russian	doll”	response	to	Korsgaard:		 	[T]heir	 response	 seems	 curiously	 off-target…	 Korsgaard	 claims	 that	 the	ability	 to	 reflect	 on	 or	 form	 judgments	 about	 what	 we	 ought	 to	 do	 is	 the	
essence	 of	 morality.	 Any	 behaviour	 that	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 this	 sort	 of	normative	 self-reflection	 is	 not	 moral	 behaviour…	 appearances	notwithstanding.	(Rowlands,	2012,	p111)		However,	 Rowlands	 himself	 also	 seems	 to	misunderstand	what	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	and	 de	Waal	 are	 doing:	 from	 their	 perspective	 it	makes	 perfect	 sense	 to	 talk	 of	 a	“tower”	 or	 “Russian	 doll”	 of	 morality	 if	 “morality”	 is	 defined	 in	 evolutionary-functional	terms.	These	researchers	are	thus	clearly	talking	at	cross-purposes.		
3.3	 “Morality”	and	normativity	So	far,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	these	two	groups	of	researchers,	who	are	ostensibly	engaged	 in	 the	 same	 debate	 over	 whether	 animals	 possess	 morality	 or	 a	 moral	psychology,	 actually	 adopt	 quite	 different	 methodologies	 when	 it	 comes	 to	determining	what	it	is	for	a	creature	to	possess	such	a	thing.	One	group	(Korsgaard	and	Rowlands)	 largely	sees	 this	as	a	conceptual	project,	while	 the	other	 (de	Waal,	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	and	most	of	the	other	authors	cited	in	Section	2)	seem	to	conceive	
	 25	
of	the	project	as	one	of	uncovering	the	nature	of	a	psychological	natural	kind.18	Part	of	 the	reason	 for	 this	methodological	difference	when	 it	comes	 to	determining	 the	answer	is	that	the	two	groups	also	interpret	the	question	of	what	 it	 is	to	possess	a	morality	or	a	moral	psychology	quite	differently.	It	is	very	important	to	understand	why	philosophers	like	Korsgaard	regard	a	capacity	for	normative	self-government	to	be	the	essence	of	morality.	As	Rowlands	points	 out,	 the	 key	 idea—which	 seems	 to	 be	 common	 to	 many	 philosophical	traditions,	not	just	the	Kantian	tradition	to	which	Korsgaard	owes	her	allegiance—is	that	this	kind	of	reflective	capacity	is	necessary	in	order	for	a	creature	have	control	over	 its	 motivations,	 and	 for	 the	 creature	 to	 exercise	 autonomy.	 Such	control/autonomy	is	seen	as	necessary	in	order	for	both	motivations	and	actions	to	count	as	genuinely	moral:		 A	 motivation	 can	 count	 as	 moral	 when	 it	 is	 morally	 normative.	 And	 a	motivation	can	be	morally	normative	only	when	its	subject	has	control	over	it.	 Control	 consists	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 critically	 reflect	 on	 or	 scrutinize	 one’s	motivations	(a	claim	endorsed	by	both	Kant	and	Aristotle),	and	this	may	be	a	function	of	the	practical	wisdom	that	allows	one	to	grasp	the	morally	salient	features	of	a	situation…	There	can	be	no	(moral)	normativity	without	control.	That	 is	 why	 animals	 cannot	 be	 moral	 subjects:	 they	 cannot	 control	 their	motivations	and	so	those	motivations	have	no	normative	status.	(Rowlands,	2012,	p122)		This	passage	illustrates	a	key	point:	for	philosophers	like	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands,	descriptive	claims	about	moral	psychology—e.g.,	what	constitutes	moral	judgment,	moral	reasoning,	or	moral	motivation—are	crucially	bound	up	with	high-level	meta-																																																								18	It	would	be	too	strong	to	say	that	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands	regard	the	debate	over	animal	morality	as	 entirely	 conceptual.	 For	 instance,	 Korsgaard	would	 be	 forced	 to	 abandon	 her	 view	 if	 empirical	research	established	that	normative	self-government	was	in	fact	beyond	the	psychological	capacity	of	human	beings	or	that	our	reflective	capacities	never	played	a	role	in	our	putatively	moral	behaviour.	The	same	would	hold	for	Rowlands	if	cognitive	science	established	that	other-directed	emotions	play	no	 motivational	 role	 in	 human	 or	 animal	 behaviour.	 Hence,	 both	 would	 accept	 that	 empirical	research	 could	 show	 that	 the	 conditions	 of	 their	 respective	 analyses	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 moral	creature	 fail	 to	 be	met	 by	 prototypically	moral	 creatures	 (i.e.,	 human	 beings)	 and	 thus	 should	 be	abandoned	or	modified.	Both	also	regard	it	to	be	an	empirical	question	as	to	which	species	actually	turn	 out	 to	 be	moral	 creatures,	 given	whatever	 analysis	 is	 finally	 accepted.	However,	 that	 is	 quite	different	from	seeing	empirical	research	as	the	primary	tool	for	determining	what	morality	is,	which	is	the	position	of	the	natural	kind	approach.	
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ethical	questions	about	the	nature	of	normativity	and	moral	value.	Morality	is	here	regarded	as	inherently	normative:	it	makes	normative	claims	on	us.	To	have	a	moral	psychology	 is	 to,	 in	some	sense,	 to	 live	within	the	world	of	such	normative	claims.		Rowlands	and	Korsgaard’s	primary	concern	in	considering	whether	animals	can	be	said	 to	have	a	moral	psychology	 is	 thus	whether	 they	possess	psychological	states	that	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 having	what	 Rowlands	 calls	normative	 grip—whether	 they	have	the	right	kind	of	normative	status	or	“oughtness”	to	them.	Crucially,	this	notion	of	 normative	 status	or	 oughtness	 isn’t	 a	purely	psychological	 one.	 It	 is	 not	 simply	about	 the	 causal	 role	 that	 particular	 psychological	 states	 (such	 as	 other-directed	emotions)	play	 in	driving	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 creature;	 it	 is	 about	whether	 these	states	have	appropriate	sensitivity	to	“the	morally	salient	features”	of	the	situation.	In	 this	respect,	a	creature	can	only	possess	a	moral	psychology	 if	 its	psychological	states	 stand	 in	 an	 appropriate	 metaphysical	 relationship	 to	moral	 properties—in	particular,	whether	 these	 properties	 (however	 they	 are	 to	 be	 understood)	 can	 be	seen	 as	 making	 normative	 claims	 on	 the	 creature.19	 Thus,	 when	 Rowlands	 talks	about	a	creature	acting	for	moral	reasons,	this	is	a	claim	about	the	normative	status	of	the	psychological	states	that	motivate	the	creature’s	actions.	What	this	means	is	that	the	answer	to	the	question	of	what	counts	as	a	genuinely	moral	psychology	and	whether	animals	can	have	such	a	psychology	depends	on	the	account	that	we	give	of	the	 nature	 of	 normativity	 and	 moral	 properties,	 and	 hence	 of	 the	 grounds	 for	morality.	 In	 this	 sense,	 moral	 psychology	 is	 fully	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 classic	foundational	questions	of	meta-ethics.			 Korsgaard		(1996)	has	a	rich	and	complex	account	of	normativity	and	of	what	it	is	for	morality	to	make	normative	claims	on	us	as	human	beings,	the	full	details	of	which	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 this	 paper.	 However,	 the	 basic	 idea	 is	 that	 the	normativity	 of	 morality	 stems	 from	 “the	 reflective	 structure	 of	 human	consciousness”:	‘‘The	source	of	the	normativity	of	moral	claims	must	be	found	in	the	agent’s	 own	 will’’	 (1996,	 p19);	 ‘‘Autonomy	 is	 the	 source	 of	 obligation,	 and	 in																																																									19	It	is	important	to	note	that	standing	in	this	relationship	shouldn't	require	that	one	must	have	the	
correct	moral	beliefs	or	attitudes,	otherwise	 this	might	 rule	out	 the	possibility	of	 someone	 like	 the	neo-Nazi	possessing	a	moral	psychology.	
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particular	 of	 our	 ability	 to	 obligate	 ourselves’’	 (1996,	 p91).	 Since	 reflection	 is	 the	source	 of	 moral	 normativity,	 creatures	 without	 such	 reflective	 capacity	 simply	cannot	 live	 in	 the	world	of	 the	normative,	 the	world	of	values,	or	 “the	kingdom	of	ends”.	Hence,	nothing	they	do	or	think	can	have	anything	to	do	with	morality,	except	insofar	 as	 they	 make	 moral	 claims	 on	 us	 qua	 creatures	 with	 the	 right	 type	 of	reflective	capacity.	All	of	this	lies	in	the	background	of	Korsgaard’s	response	to	de	Waal.	This	is	why	normative	self-government	is	the	essence	of	morality	and	animals	lack	even	the	building	blocks	of	morality.	This	 is	also	why	 it	 insufficient	 for	 critics	of	Korsgaard	(e.g.,	Musschenga,	2013;	Andrews,	2015)	to	respond	to	her	denial	of	animal	morality	by	citing	the	empirical	work	in	cognitive	science	on	the	apparent	rarity	of	reflection	in	everyday	“moral”	cognition	in	humans	(e.g.,	Haidt,	2001;	Mikhail,	2011).	For	one	thing,	Korsgaard	can	emphasize	that	neuro-typical	humans	still	have	this	reflective	capacity,	even	if	it	is	rarely	and	imperfectly	deployed,	so	these	humans	can	still	live	within	the	world	of	the	normative,	while	animals	cannot.	But,	most	importantly,	she	can	claim	that	this	work	tells	us	nothing	about	normativity	and	hence	about	moral	psychology,	as	she	conceives	of	it.	Rowlands’	goal	is	to	undermine	such	intellectualist	accounts	of	what	it	is	for	a	creature’s	psychological	states	to	have	normative	status.	He	argues	that	the	notion	of	 control	 or	 autonomy	 invoked	 by	 Kantians	 like	 Korsgaard	 is	 elusive	 and	 that	adding	 in	 a	 capacity	 for	 reflection,	 by	 itself,	 fails	 to	 explain	 how	 particular	psychological	 states	 can	 gain	 normative	 status.	 This	 opens	 the	 door	 for	 an	externalist	 (rather	 than	 internalist	 intellectualist)	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 have	normative	sensitivity	to	morally	salient	features	of	a	situation.	Add	to	this	a	broadly	consequentialist	 account	 of	 moral	 properties,	 and	 we	 have	 an	 account	 of	 moral	normativity	 that	 allows	 that	 the	 motivational	 states	 of	 unreflective	 animals	 and	creatures	like	Myshkin—e.g.,	other-directed	emotions,	which	track	others’	suffering	or	well-being—can	be	regarded	as	genuinely	moral	reasons	for	action.	This	 shows	 why	 the	 kind	 of	 conceptual	 analysis	 project	 Korsgaard	 and	Rowland's	 are	 pursing	 is	 rather	 more	 complex	 than	 the	 picture	 of	 conceptual	analysis	we	get	from	Stich	and	colleagues.	Defining	what	counts	as	genuinely	moral	
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cognition	 and	 motivation	 isn't	 just	 about	 comparing	 proposed	 analyses	 with	intuitions	about	the	application	of	the	concepts.	It	is	also	crucially	bound	up	with	a	variety	 of	 background	 theoretical	 concerns	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 normativity	 and	moral	 properties	 and	 what	 it	 is	 for	 one’s	 psychological	 states	 to	 track,	 or	 be	appropriately	 sensitive	 to,	 such	 things—Rowlands	 depends	 on	 a	 broadly	consequentialist	 theory	 (and,	 arguably,	 a	 form	 of	 moral	 realism	 [Monsó,	 2015]),	while	 Korsgaard	 adopts	 a	 form	 of	 Kantian	 constructivism.	 This	 means	 that	 the	resultant	analyses	can	be	revisionary	with	respect	to	ordinary	folk	intuitions	about	the	application	of	these	concepts,	in	so	far	as	this	is	necessary	to	meet	the	relevant	background	 theoretical	 constraints	 (this	 is	why	 the	Myshkin	 case	 can't	 do	 all	 the	work	for	Rowlands).	However,	most	 importantly,	 this	 also	 shows	why	 the	 two	 groups	 interpret	the	question	of	what	it	is	to	possess	a	moral	psychology	and	whether	animals	have	such	 a	 psychology	 quite	 differently.	 Despite	 their	 disagreements,	 Rowlands	 and	Korsgaard	agree	that	this	is	a	question	fundamentally	bound	up	with	philosophical	theorizing	about	the	nature	of	moral	normativity.	The	issue	is	whether	animals	can	have	psychological	states	with	normative	status—whether	they	can	live	within	the	world	 of	 values.	 However,	 de	 Waal	 and	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	concerned	 with	 such	 high-level	 philosophical	 issues	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 moral	properties	and	what	 it	 is	 to	be	psychologically	 sensitive	 to	 the	normative.	Though	they	do	make	 approving	 references	here	 and	 there	 to	 the	 sentimentalist	 tradition	(de	 Waal	 makes	 several	 references	 to	 Adam	 Smith,	 for	 instance)	 and	 to	 other	philosophical	 theories	of	morality,	neither	of	 them	offer,	or	 claim	 to	presume,	any	account	 of	 normativity	 or	moral	 value.	 They	are	 concerned	with	whether	 animals	make	 normative	 evaluations	 in	 a	 purely	 psychological	 sense—for	 instance,	judgments	 of	 disapproval	 about	 others’	 behaviour—but	 this	 isn't	 sufficient	 for	normativity	in	the	sense	at	stake	for	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands,	since	one	has	to	show	that	such	 judgments	make	normative	claims	on	 the	animal	 (i.e.,	 that	 they	bear	 the	appropriate	 relationship	 to	 moral	 properties,	 however	 that	 relationship	 and	 the	properties	themselves	are	to	be	understood),	rather	than	just	playing	a	causal	role	in	driving	behaviour.	 Indeed,	 their	 project	would	 still	 seem	 to	make	 sense	 even	 if	
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one	were	to	deny	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	moral	normativity	or	moral	value	in	the	sense	of	interest	to	meta-ethicists,	or	that	humans	possess	psychological	states	with	 normative	 status.	 The	 issue,	 for	 them,	 is	 about	 uncovering	 the	 psychological	mechanisms	that	underlie	morality,	conceived	as	a	psychological	natural	kind—i.e.,	the	 extension	 of	 what	 we	 ordinarily	 regard	 as	 moral	 thinking	 or	 motivation—whether	or	not	 this	matches	up	with	what	 comes	out	of	a	meta-ethical	account	of	what	moral	normativity	is,	and	whether	any	animals	possess	instances	of	this	kind.	Hence,	what	we	have	here	are	two	very	different	conceptions	of	what	it	is	to	do	moral	psychology.	The	approach	of	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	falls	broadly	in	line	 with	 the	 interdisciplinary	 field	 that	 now	 gets	 called	 “empirical	 moral	psychology”,	exemplified	by	researchers	 like	Nichols	(2004),	Mikhail	(2011),	Haidt	(2012),	 Greene	 (2013),	 Prinz	 (2014),	 and	many	 others.	 For	 such	 empirical	moral	psychologists,	 the	discovery,	 for	 instance,	 that	normative	reflection	 is	rare	 in	most	actual	 human	beings	 is	 a	 compelling	 reason	 to	 downplay	 its	 role	 in	 human	moral	cognition.	 Whatever	 normative	 or	 meta-ethical	 implications	 might	 be	 taken	 to	follow	 from	 the	 answers	 that	 are	 given,	 questions	 about	 what	 counts	 as	 moral	judgment,	moral	reasoning,	and	so	forth,	are	seen	as	empirical	questions	that	can,	at	least	at	the	outset,	be	bracketed	off	from,	say,	an	account	of	moral	value.	However,	for	 Korsgaard	 and	 Rowlands’	 brand	 of	 moral	 psychology,	 how	 one	 answers	 such	questions	is	crucially	philosophically	loaded,	and	it	is	impossible	to	understand	the	motivations	 for	 their	 respective	accounts	of	what	 it	 is	 to	have	a	moral	psychology	without	 understanding	 their	 background	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 moral	value.	 I	don’t	want	to	downplay	the	interest	or	the	importance	of	the	meta-ethical	issues	 that	 form	 the	 background	 to	 Rowlands	 and	 Korsgaard’s	 contributions.	Rowlands,	 for	 instance,	 thinks	 that	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 there	 is	 an	 adequate	account	of	normativity	that	can	potentially	be	applied	to	the	psychological	states	of	animals	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 thinking	 about	 our	 ethical	 responsibilities	towards	them.	If	it	turns	out	that	some	animals	are	capable	of	doing	good	qua	moral	subjects,	 then,	 Rowlands	 (2012,	 p250-254)	 argues,	 this	 should	 incline	 us	 towards	the	view	 that	 these	 creatures	are	worthy	of	moral	 respect.	Although	 they	 can’t	be	
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praised	(or	blamed)	 for	what	 they	do	(since	 they	 lack	 full	moral	agency),	 they	are	capable	 of	 making	 the	 world	 a	 better	 place,	 and	 are	 thus	 deserving	 of	 a	 type	 of	respect	that	goes	beyond	simply	admiring	their	aesthetic	or	other	properties.20	That	said,	 I	 do	 think	 that	 there	 is	 something	 fishy	 about	 defining	moral	 cognition	 and	motivation	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 one’s	 preferred	 account	 of	moral	normativity	and	moral	value.	The	idea	seems	to	be	that	we	can	save	the	normative	force	 of	morality	 if	we	define	 it	 like	 this,	 hence	 anything	 that	 doesn't	 fit	with	 this	account	of	normativity	can't	really	be	morality.21	This	savours	somewhat	of	stacking	the	 deck,	 and	 certainly	 runs	 against	 the	 view	 of	 many	 contemporary	 meta-ethicists—including,	 for	 instance,	 Joyce	 (2006)	 and	 Kitcher	 (2011)—that	 the	 best	way	to	approach	the	classic	foundational	questions	of	meta-ethics	is	to	start	from	an	empirically	informed	account	of	the	nature	and	evolution	of	moral	cognition,	rather	than	have	one’s	account	of	the	nature	of	moral	cognition	depend	on	prior	answers	to	these	questions.	Nonetheless,	 what	 I	 think	 is	 curiously	 missing	 from	 the	 discussions	 of	Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	(given	how	careful	they	are	in	other	respects),	along	with	various	commentaries	from	others	on	their	putative	engagements	with	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	(e.g.,	Musschenga,	2013;	Andrews,	2015),	is	awareness	of	the	fact																																																									20	Although	claims	about	the	supposedly	unique	place	of	human	beings	in	the	world	of	the	normative	have	 often	 been	 used	 to	 justify	 our	 using	 animals	 for	 food	 and	 other	 purposes,	 Korsgaard	 (2006,	p119)	 actually	 views	 the	 implications	 of	 what	 she	 believes	 to	 be	 our	 normative	 uniqueness	 quite	differently:	“As	beings	who	are	capable	of	doing	what	we	ought	and	holding	ourselves	responsible	for	what	we	do,	and	as	beings	who	are	capable	of	caring	about	what	we	are	and	not	just	about	what	we	can	get	 for	ourselves,	we	are	under	a	strong	obligation	to	 treat	 the	other	animals	decently,	even	at	cost	to	ourselves”.	21	 That	 kind	 of	 strategy	 seems	 to	 be	 particularly	 central	 to	 the	 Kantian	 tradition.	 As	 I	 read	 the	
Groundwork,	 Kant	 starts	 from	 the	 presupposition	 that	 morality	 can't	 be	 universal	 and	 rationally	compelling	 unless	we	 view	 it	 as	 springing	 from	 the	 dictates	 of	 reason	 and	 thus	 based	 on	 a	 priori	rather	 than	 a	 posteriori	 foundations.	 This	 leads	 to	 an	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 engage	 in	 moral	cognition	 and	 action.	 Hence,	 epistemic	 and	 metaphysical	 concerns	 about	 the	 grounds	 of	 morality	drive	Kant’s	account	of	what	moral	cognition	and	action	are.	Similarly,	Korsgaard's	(1996)	response	to	what	she	calls	“the	normative	problem”	and	her	concerns	about	traditional	forms	of	metaphysical	moral	 realism,	drive	her	account	of	what	normative	 thinking	consists	 in.	Rowlands	 is	 less	guilty	of	this,	 regarding	 his	 sentimentalist	 account	 of	 moral	 motivation	 as	 at	 least	 partly	 motivated	 by	empirical	evidence	about	the	role	of	emotions	in	human	moral	behaviour.	After	raising	problems	for	reflection-based	accounts	of	normativity,	Rowlands	(2012,	chapter	9)	takes	seriously	the	possibility	that	 normativity	might	 be	 an	 illusion,	 but	 he	 still	 seems	 to	 think	 that	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	moral	motivation	and	whether	animals	can	act	for	moral	reasons	requires	that	we	have	an	account	of	moral	normativity	in	place.	
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that,	in	focusing	on	issues	of	normativity,	they	are	pursing	a	completely	different	sort	of	project	from	the	one	that	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	are	pursuing.	Rowlands,	in	 particular,	 sees	 himself	 as	 correcting	 the	 logical	 flaws	 in	 the	 arguments	 of	researchers	 like	Bekoff	and	Pierce	when	they	claim	that	animals	are	moral	beings.	For	 instance,	 following	 on	 from	 his	 above	 quoted	 critique	 of	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce’s	response	to	Korsgaard,	Rowlands	says	this:		In	invoking	the	Russian	doll	analogy,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	have,	in	effect,	issued	an	 invitation:	why	 don’t	 you	 think	 of	morality	 in	 this	way?	 Korsgaard	 and	Kant	would	likely	respond	with	a	firm	“No	thanks.”	To	have	any	impact,	the	offer	needs	to	be	strengthened	into	something	more	like	an	offer	that	cannot	be	refused.	(2012,	p111-12).		But,	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 shouldn’t	 really	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 in	 genuine	 dialogue	with	Kantian	 conceptions	 of	 morality.	 That	 would	 be	 to	 confuse	 two	 related,	 but	nonetheless	 distinct,	 sets	 of	 issues:	 issues	 about	 the	 normative	 status	 (in	 the	metaphysical	sense)	of	the	psychological	states	of	these	animals—whether	they	live	in	 the	world	 of	 values,	 as	 Kantians	 conceive	 of	 it,	 for	 instance—and	 issues	 solely	about	 whether	 these	 states	 represent	 instances	 of	 a	 natural	 kind,	 irrespective	 of	their	 normative	 status.	 It	 is	 no	 failing	 of	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 that	 their	 account	 of	morality	 isn't	 going	 to	 be	 accepted	 by	 Kantians	 that	 want	 something	 completely	different	from	an	account	of	morality	than	what	they	claim	to	provide.	We’ve	seen	that	the	putative	engagements	between	researchers	like	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	and	researchers	like	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands	over	whether	animals	 possess	 a	moral	 psychology	 are	 actually	 not	 genuine	 engagements	 at	 all;	these	researchers	have	simply	been	talking	past	each	other	and	in	more	ways	than	one.	 This	 is	 one	 respect	 in	 which	 the	 current	 debate	 over	 animal	 morality	 is	unproductive.	I	now	want	to	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	debate	over	animal	morality:	 the	one	 that	de	Waal,	Bekoff	 and	Pierce,	 and	most	of	 the	others	 cited	 in	Section	 2	 are	 engaged	 in,	which	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 nature	 and	 distribution	 of	morality	 conceived	 as	 a	 natural	 kind,	 but	which	 isn’t	 directly	 concerned	with	 the	meta-ethical	 issues	 that	 pre-occupy	 Rowlands	 and	 Korsgaard.	 Rowlands	 and	
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Korsgaard’s	 accounts	 can	be	 reconstructed	 in	 this	 light.	However,	 I	want	 to	 argue	that	this	debate,	as	it	stands,	is	in	fact	largely	terminological	and	non-substantive.		 	
4.	 The	core	debate:	merely	terminological?	The	notion	of	psychological	natural	kinds	is	fundamental	to	standard	conceptions	of	the	subject	matter	and	methodology	of	modern	cognitive	science	(e.g.,	Fodor,	1974;	Griffiths,	 1997;	Machery,	 2009).22	 Andrews	 (2015)	 provides	 a	 nice	 description	 of	this	methodology—what	she	calls	the	calibration	approach—in	the	study	of	animal	cognition:		[W]e	start	with	a	theory	about	the	nature	of	some	mental	property,	then	we	use	that	theory	to	make	a	considered	judgment	about	whether	some	animal	has	 that	 property,	 and	 use	 that	 judgment	 to	 empirically	 investigate	 the	property.	The	results	of	that	investigation	may	cause	us	to	tweak	our	theory,	our	considered	judgment,	or	both.	(Andrews,	2015,	p22)		She	provides	several	examples	of	the	approach	at	work,	and	shows	how	it	can	help	us	 to	move	 forward,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 the	 real	 nature	 of	 particular	mental	properties	and	determining	how	widely	shared	 these	properties	are	 in	 the	animal	kingdom.	One	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 methodology	 of	cognitive	science	is	that	the	discovery	that	some	putative	psychological	term	fails	to	pick	 out	 a	 clear	 natural	 kind	 seems	 to	 constitute	 a	 reason	 to	 eliminate	 it	 from	cognitive	scientific	discourse	(Griffiths,	1997;	Machery,	2009).	For	example,	there	is	general	 agreement	 amongst	 cognitive	 scientists	 that	 “intelligence”	 and	 “memory”	
																																																								22	The	notion	of	natural	 kinds	 is,	 of	 course,	 itself	 a	 contested	one,	with	many	different	 accounts	of	what	 natural	 kinds	 are	 (see	 Bird	 and	 Tobin,	 2015;	 Slater,	 2015)—so	 many,	 in	 fact,	 that	 Hacking	(2007,	p238)	doubts	whether	there	is	“a	precise	[or]	vague	class	of	classifications	that	may	usefully	be	called	the	class	of	natural	kinds”.	There	is	also	controversy	about	what	account	of	natural	kinds	is	best	 for	 cognitive	 science.	As	noted	 earlier,	 the	HPC	 account	 (Boyd,	 1999)	 is	 popular,	 but	 faces	 its	problems	(see,	e.g.,	Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015).	I	don’t	want	to	commit	to	any	particular	account	of	 natural	 kinds	 or	 psychological	 natural	 kinds,	 but	 I	 will	 take	 it	 for	 granted	 that	 there	 do	 exist	psychological	natural	kinds	that	can,	at	least	partly,	be	understood	in	terms	of	their	function.	Hence,	I	will	 not	 take	 the	more	 radical	 approach	 to	 critiquing	 the	 core	 debate	 over	 animal	morality,	which	would	be	to	challenge	the	very	legitimacy	of	talking	about	natural	kinds	in	general	or	specifically	in	cognitive	science.	
	 33	
are	 not	 legitimate	 theoretical	 terms	 because	 neither	 term	 refers	 to	 a	 category	 of	thing	that	has	the	hallmarks	of	a	natural	kind.	The	view	is	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	 general	 intelligence,	 only	 more	 fine-grained	 types	 of	 cognitive	 capacity	 sub-served	by	a	wide	variety	of	different	neurological	mechanisms.	 Similarly,	memory	turns	out	not	to	be	a	unified	psychological	category,	rather	there	are	many	different	types	of	memory	 (semantic	memory,	declarative	memory,	 and	 so	 forth),	 also	 sub-served	by	quite	different	neurological	mechanisms.	In	this	vein,	Stich	and	colleagues	argue	that,	despite	the	impressive	empirical	evidence	 that	 Turiel	 and	 colleagues	 have	 marshalled,	 their	 account	 of	 moral	judgment	actually	fails	to	describe	a	really	existing	psychological	natural	kind,	since	one	can	find	many	instances	where	prototypical	moral	judgments	don’t	display	the	characteristic	 psychological	 profile	 they	 regard	 as	 typical	 of	 the	 kind	 (e.g.,	 they	aren’t	viewed	by	experimental	participants	as	authority-independent	or	universal),	and	 instances	 where	 judgments	 concerning	 putatively	 conventional	 matters	 (e.g.,	violations	 of	 norms	 that	 don’t	 obviously	 concern	 issues	 of	 harm	 and	 fairness)	display	the	“moral”	rather	than	“conventional”	profile	(Kelly	et	al.,	2007;	Fessler	et	al.,	 2015).	Hence,	 the	Turiel	 account	 of	moral	 judgment	qua	 psychological	 natural	kind	 fails	 to	 accurately	 carve	 nature	 at	 its	 joints:	 there	 isn't	 enough	 of	 a	nominological	clustering	here	to	say	that	we	have	a	genuine	natural	kind.	Stich	and	colleagues	 go	 so	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 term	 “moral	 judgment”,	 when	 used	 to	refer	 to	 a	 distinct	 sub-set	 of	 normative	 or	 evaluative	 judgments,	might,	 therefore,	need	to	be	eliminated	from	the	vocabulary	of	cognitive	science.23	However,	despite	the	problems	that	Stich	and	colleagues	have	identified	with	the	Turiel	account	of	the	moral/conventional	distinction	(for	responses,	see	Sousa,																																																									23	 Once	 again,	 the	 assumption	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 if	 Turiel	 and	 colleagues	 are	 right,	moral	 judgment	would	 constitute	 something	 like	 an	HPC	kind.	Hence,	 Stich	 and	 colleagues’	 argument	 is	 that	moral	and	conventional	normative	 judgments	don’t	display	 sufficiently	 stable	 clusterings	of	properties	 to	constitute	 different	 psychological	 kinds.	 Kelly	 and	 Stich	 (2007)	 also	 argue	 that	 the	 psychological	processes	that	underlie	the	two	putative	types	of	judgment	are	likely	the	same,	which	would	threaten	the	 idea	 of	 there	 being	 two	 different	 homeostatic	 mechanisms.	 Stich	 and	 colleagues	 do,	 however,	regard	the	more	general	category	of	normative	judgment	as	a	genuine	natural	kind.	Sinnott-Armstrong	 and	Wheatley	 (2014)	 make	 a	 different	 type	 of	 argument	 for	 a	 similar	conclusion:	 the	 category,	moral	 judgment,	 is	dis-unified	 in	a	 similar	manner	 to	memory,	 so	 fails	 to	constitute	a	genuine	natural	kind.	
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2009;	 Kumar,	 2015),	 there	 remains	 the	 possibility	 of	 other	 ways	 of	 thinking	 of	morality	 as	 a	 psychological	 natural	 kind.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 animal	morality,	 Andrews	 expresses	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 optimism	 about	 using	 the	calibration	approach	to	eventually	determine	“the	sort	of	capacity	required	to	make	the	moral-looking	 behaviour	 into	 truly	moral	 behaviour”	 (2015,	 p184).	 I	 am	 less	optimistic	 than	 Andrews,	 however.	 To	 explain	 why,	 let	 us	 review	 some	 of	 the	different	accounts	that	have	been	proposed	for	defining	morality	qua	psychological	natural	kind.	As	we’ve	seen,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	adopt	a	very	broad	view,	lumping	together	capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy	and	other	potential	mechanisms	for	producing	various	 (psychologically)	 altruistic	 helping	 and	 consoling	 behaviours,	 capacities	underlying	 the	 internalization	 and	 enforcement	 of	 social	 norms	 (like	 norms	governing	 play	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 infants	 in	 chimpanzees,	 say),	 and	 more	cognitively	 sophisticated	 capacities	 for	 explicitly	 formulating	 and	 promulgating	social	norms,	explicit	normative	reflection,	and	so	forth,	that	may	only	be	present	in	humans.	Once	again,	their	reason	for	lumping	these	capacities	together	into	a	single	category	is	that	they	are	assumed	to	share	broadly	the	same	evolutionary	function:	they	 each	 represent	ways	 of	 facilitating	 social	 co-operation	 and	 cohesion—that	 is	the	purpose	of	morality,	as	Bekoff	and	Pierce	conceive	of	it.	Musschenga	(2013)	also	offers	a	functional	definition.	However,	his	is	slightly	more	restrictive	in	that	it	explicitly	builds	in	the	idea	that	morality	only	truly	exists	when	 there	 are	norms	or	 rules.	While	 empathetic	 or	 altruistic	 behaviours	may	be	the	product	of	 internalized	social	norms,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	appear	to	allow	for	the	possibility	of	there	being	moral	creatures	with	capacities	for	empathy	and	altruism,	but	without	social	norms.24	Musschenga’s	functional	definition	is	as	follows:																																																										24	 Although	 Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 (2009,	 p83)	 include	 “established	 norms	 of	 behaviour”	 under	 their	threshold	 requirements	 for	 being	 a	 moral	 creature,	 their	 original	 definition	 of	 “morality”	 actually	seems	to	leave	open	the	possibility	of	there	being	moral	behaviours	in	animals	(e.g.,	instances	of	pro-social	and	altruistic	behaviour)	that	aren’t	necessarily	guided	by	psychologically	internalized	norms,	since,	 when	 describing	 which	 behaviours	 are	 moral,	 it	 says	 only	 that	 “norms	 of	 right	 and	 wrong	attach	to	many	of	them”	(2009,	p7).	
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Morality	cultivates	and	regulates	social	life	within	a	group	or	community	by	providing	 rules	 (norms)	 which	 fortify	 natural	 tendencies	 that	 bind	 the	members	 together—such	 as	 sympathy,	 (indirect)	 reciprocity,	 loyalty	 to	 the	group	and	family,	and	so	on—and	counter	natural	 tendencies	 that	 frustrate	and	undermine	cooperation—such	as	selfishness,	within-group	violence	and	cheating.	(2013,	p102)		Musschenga	 stresses	 that	 norms	 don't	 have	 to	 be	 explicitly	 formulated	 or	consciously	 understood	 to	 count	 as	 moral	 in	 this	 sense,	 but	 can	 be	 implicit—for	instance,	“humbly	internalized”	in	the	sense	of	Railton	(2006).	As	we’ve	seen,	de	Waal	labels	most	of	the	capacities	identified	by	Bekoff	and	Pierce	as	“proto-moral”	and	restricts	the	term	“moral”	for	those	that	enable	humans	to	explicitly	formulate	and	promulgate	social	norms	that	concern	the	community	as	a	 whole:	 proto-morality	 is	 a	 social	 glue,	 but	morality	 (so	 understood)	 is	 a	 better	social	 glue.	 Here,	 again,	 morality	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 evolutionary-functional	terms,	but	its	adaptive	function	is	defined	more	narrowly	than	on	Musschenga	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce’s	accounts,	hence	“morality”	picks	out	a	narrower	set	of	capacities.	Kitcher	 (2006,	 2011)	 offers	 a	 similarly	 narrowed	 functional	 definition	 of	what	 he	terms	“the	ethical	project”.	Kitcher	grants	other	apes	with	capacities	for	sympathy,	empathy,	and	psychological	altruism,	but	argues	that	these	capacities	are	limited	in	important	ways,	 and	 claims	 that	 a	 linguistically-mediated	 capacity	 for	 “normative	guidance”—essentially,	a	capacity	to	internalize	and	enforce	commands,	particularly	in	 reference	 to	 one’s	 own	 behaviour—evolved	 in	 early	 hominins	 specifically	 to	remediate	 the	 repeated	 “altruism	 failures”	 from	 which	 other	 apes,	 particularly	chimpanzees,	suffer.	The	function	of	morality	is	thus	to	overcome	what	Kitcher	sees	as	the	fragility	and	instability	of	the	societies	of	our	ape-like	ancestors.25	Rudolf	von	Rohr	et	al.	 (2011)	adopt	a	very	similar	position	 to	de	Waal	and	Kitcher	in	their	taxonomy	of	social	norms,	restricting	the	term	“moral”	to	norms	that	are	 “collectivized”:	 norms	 that	 are	 publicly	 understood	 by	 each	 member	 of	 the																																																									25	 Kitcher	 (2011)	 uses	 this	 descriptive	 definition	 to	 build	 a	 form	 of	 pragmatic	 ethical	 naturalism,	where	a	notion	of	ethical	truth	(and	with	it	a	normative	standard	for	assessing	ethical	propositions)	is	 constructed	 from	 this	 conception	 of	 the	 adaptive	 function	 of	morality	 (for	 discussion,	 see	 Joyce,	2014).	
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community	 as	 norms	 of	 the	 community,	 rather	 than	 just	 existing	 in	 the	 form	 of	implicit	 or	 personal	 expectations	 about	 appropriate	 and	 inappropriate	 behaviour.	They	 argue	 that	 this	 collectivization	 of	 norms	 requires	 the	 capacity	 for	 shared-intentionality	 (the	 ability	 to	 actively	 share	 one’s	mental	 states	with	 others	 and	 to	understand	 that	 others	 have,	 for	 instance,	 the	 same	 goals	 or	 beliefs	 as	 oneself),	which	 is	widely	believed	 to	be	unique	 to	humans,	 and,	probably,	 language.	Hence,	while	 animals	 like	 chimpanzees	 possess	what	 they	 call	 “proto-social	 norms”,	 they	lack	genuine	morality.	Joyce	 (2006)	 and	 Prinz	 (2014)	 shift	 the	 focus	 from	 moral	 norms	 to	 the	capacity	 for	 moral	 judgment	 as	 the	 essence	 of	 morality.	 Much	 like	 Turiel	 and	colleagues,	 Joyce	characterizes	moral	 judgments	as	possessing	a	particular	kind	of	psychological	 clout	 and	 inescapability	 to	 them.	 However,	 he	 also	 draws	 a	fundamental	link	with	concepts	like	merit	and	desert.	He	argues	that	other	primates	likely	 can	 make	 primitive	 normative	 judgments:	 for	 instance,	 judgments	 of	disapproval	about	others’	norm-violating	behaviour.	However,	they	can't	make	truly	moral	 judgments	 because	 they	 plausibly	 can't	 judge,	 for	 instance,	 that	 a	 punitive	response	 to	 another	 individual’s	 behaviour	 is	merited	 or	 deserved.	 Such	 concepts	are,	Joyce	argues,	likely	beyond	the	reach	of	non-linguistic	animals.	Prinz	identifies	genuinely	moral	judgments	with	dispositions	to	feel	certain	complex	self-	and	other-directed	emotions	like	guilt,	shame,	and	contempt:	to	judge	something	to	be	wrong	is	to	be	inclined	(e.g.,	upon	reflection)	to	feel	such	emotions	towards	the	creature	that	did	the	thing	in	question.	Such	complex	moral	emotions,	he	suggests,	are	probably	uniquely	human.26	Others	can	be	seen	as	requiring	more	cognitive	sophistication	 than	 just	 the	capacity	 to	make	moral	 judgments	 in	either	of	 the	senses	 just	described.	As	noted	earlier,	 Hume	 can	 be	 read	 as	 holding	 that	 to	 have	 a	 genuinely	 moral	 psychology	requires	that	one	be	capable	of	departing	from	one’s	private	situation	and	adopting	a	position	of	impartiality,	while	Darwin	held	that	only	when	a	capacity	for	normative																																																									26	Prinz	 (2011)	argues	 that	empathy	 is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	 for	moral	 judgment.	Unlike	Joyce,	Prinz	(2014)	does	not	regard	the	capacity	 for	moral	 judgment	as	a	biological	adaptation,	but	rather	as	a	byproduct	of	other	uniquely	human	adaptations.	
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self-reflection	 emerges	 do	 we	 have	 genuine	 morality	 (Rowlands,	 2012).	 We	 can	reconstruct	 Korsgaard’s	 claims	 in	 a	 similar	 light,	 requiring	 a	 particularly	sophisticated	from	of	meta-cognition,	as	does	Ayala’s	account.	In	 contrast,	we	 can	 reconstruct	 Rowlands	 as	 claiming	 that	 it	 is	 a	 sufficient	(but	 not	 a	 necessary)	 condition	 for	 morality	 qua	 natural	 kind	 to	 be	 instantiated	when	 there	 is	 the	 capacity	 for	 behaviour	 motivated	 by	 other-directed	 emotions.	Similarly,	 for	 Andrews	 and	 Gruen	 (2014),	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 demonstrate	 the	existence	 of	 morality	 to	 show	 that	 members	 of	 a	 particular	 species	 are	 at	 least	implicitly	sensitive—e.g.,	via	other-directed	emotional	capacities—to	the	needs	and	interests	of	others.	One	can	 take	 issues	with	each	of	 these	accounts	 in	various	ways.	However,	the	key	question	for	our	purposes	is	on	what	grounds	should	any	of	these	proposals	be	 preferred	 to	 any	 of	 the	 others	 as	 an	 articulation	 of	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 terms	“morality”	 or	 “moral”?	 Once	 again,	 the	 assumption	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 this	 isn't	 a	purely	terminological	dispute,	but	one	of	actual	substance.	Yet,	when	these	different	accounts	are	placed	side	by	side,	it	is	hard	to	see	what	justification	there	can	be	for	regarding	one	of	them	as	having	any	greater	claim	to	the	term	“morality”	than	the	others.	Crucially,	though	each	of	these	accounts	makes	substantive	empirical	claims	about	 human	 and	 animal	 psychology	 and	 evolution	 that	 might	 turn	 out	 to	 be	mistaken	in	various	ways,	the	primary	differences	between	them	when	it	comes	to	categorizing	various	psychological	capacities	or	mechanisms	as	inside	or	outside	the	moral	domain	don’t	 appear	 to	 turn	on	 such	claims.	For	 instance,	 Joyce	and	Bekoff	and	 Pierce	 can	 agree	 that	 animals	 possess	 capacities	 for	 empathy	 and	 sympathy,	pro-social	 and	 altruistic	 motivation,	 that	 they	 can	 make	 primitive	 normative	judgments	in	accordance	with	social	norms	that	exist	in	their	communities,	and	that	these	traits	broadly	share	a	similar	evolutionary	function	of	improving	levels	of	co-operation	and	social	cohesion.	They	can	also	agree	that	only	humans	likely	possess	the	 concepts	of	merit	 and	desert.	 Joyce	and	Bekoff	 and	Pierce	 can	also	agree	with	Prinz	that	only	humans	are	capable	of	feeling	emotions	like	guilt	and	shame.	All	of	them	 can	potentially	 agree	with	 de	Waal,	 Rudolf	 von	Rohr	 et	 al.,	 and	Kitcher	 that	only	in	human	communities	do	there	exist	explicitly	shared	norms	of	conduct,	with	
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Hume	and	Darwin	that	only	humans	are	capable	of	engaging	in	conscious	normative	reflection	 and	 adopting	 a	 position	 of	 impartiality,	 and	 with	 Korsgaard	 that	 only	humans	 have	 the	 capacity	 for	 normative	 self-government.	 The	 disagreement	between	 these	 researchers	 seems	 to	 concern	not	 the	nature	of	 these	 capacities	or	which	 of	 them	 we	 share	 with	 other	 animals,	 but	 solely	 which	 grouping	 of	 them	deserves	a	particular	 label.	Hence,	 it	 is	hard	to	see	what	empirical	discovery	could	help	 us	 decide	 between	 them.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 situation	 appears	 to	 be	 quite	unlike	classic	disagreements	about	the	nature	of	natural	kinds,	such	as	whether	heat	is	 a	 type	 of	 fluid	 or	 molecular	 kinetic	 energy,	 where	 the	 disagreement	 is	 clearly	resolvable	via	empirical	investigation.	Interestingly,	 Joyce	 (2014)	 draws	 the	 comparison	 between	 accounts	 of	 the	nature	 and	 evolution	 of	 moral	 judgment	 with	 discussions	 about	 the	 nature	 and	evolution	 of	 language.	 Historically,	 linguists,	 particularly	 those	 in	 the	 Chomksian	tradition,	 have	 tended	 to	 get	 upset	 if	 animal	 communication	 systems	 such	 as	 the	honey	bee	waggle	dance	or	primate	alarm	calls	are	referred	to	as	“languages”,	since	they	 like	 to	 reserve	 the	 term	 “language”	 for	 communication	 systems	 that	 have	complex	 hierarchical	 and	 recursive	 syntactic	 structure.	 However,	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 pre-theoretical	 classification,	 intuitions	 clearly	 appear	 to	 vary	 on	whether	these	are	languages	or	not.	More	recently,	Chomskians	(e.g.,	Hauser	et	al.,	2002)	have	seemed	to	accept	that	there	 is	no	debate	of	substance	to	be	had	about	whether	 the	 term	 “language”	 should	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 broad	 fashion	 to	 include	such	non-syntactically	structured	communication	systems,	or	 in	a	more	restrictive	way	to	refer	solely	to	communication	systems	with	such	structure.	As	Joyce	notes:		There	 is	 no	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	which	 idea	 captures	what	 is	 “really”	language;	our	vernacular	concept	of	language	is	simply	not	so	fine-grained	as	to	 license	 one	 answer	 while	 excluding	 the	 other.	 Faced	 with	 the	 query	 of	whether	 vervet	monkeys,	 say,	 have	 a	 language,	 the	only	 sensible	 answer	 is	“In	one	sense	yes	and	in	one	sense	no.”	(2014,	p272)		Joyce	 continues,	 “The	 same	 may	 be	 true	 of	 morality.	 The	 vernacular	 notion	 of	 a	moral	 judgment	 may	 simply	 be	 indeterminate	 in	 various	 respects,	 allowing	 of	 a	variety	of	precisifications,	with	no	particular	one	 commanding	acceptance”	 (ibid.).	
	 39	
That	seems	right	to	me.	However,	Joyce	goes	on	to	say	that	his	account	is	an	account	of	 moral	 judgment	 “strictly	 construed”,	 and	 that	 we	 can	 only	 countenance	 the	possibility	of	chimpanzees	possessing	the	capacity	for	moral	judgment	“very	loosely	construed”.	 It	 is	 unclear	why	we	 should	 grant	 him	 this	 use	 of	 “strict”	 and	 “loose”,	since	 it	 implies	 different	 degrees	 of	 correctness	 of	 usage.	What	 I	 think	we	 should	take	 away	 from	 this	 comparison	 is	 that	 it	 is	 fine	 for	 linguists	 to	 adopt	 the	 term	“language”	as	a	 term	of	art	and	give	 it	 a	precise	definition	 for	 their	own	purposes	that	would	exclude,	say,	vervet	monkey	alarm	calls,	but	there	is	no	genuine	question	as	to	whether	this	is	“strict”	or	“loose”	usage.	In	other	words,	“language”	can	be	used	to	refer	to	(at	least)	two	different	putative	natural	kinds—the	set	of	communication	systems	 that	 would	 include	 human	 natural	 languages	 like	 English	 and	 vervet	monkey	 alarm	 calls,	 or	 to	 the	 subset	 of	 such	 communication	 systems	 that	 utilize	hierarchical	recursive	structure—but	there	is	no	question	of	which	kind	should	be	seen	as	having	greater	degree	of	ownership	over	 the	 term—i.e.,	which	constitutes	
real	language.	Similarly,	it	is	fine	for	Joyce	to	use	the	term	“moral	judgment”	to	refer	only	 to	 creatures	 that	 possess	 the	 concepts	 of	 merit	 and	 desert—excluding,	 for	instance,	the	negative	reaction	of	a	chimpanzee	towards	a	conspecific	that	attempts	infanticide—but	 there	 is	 no	 question	 of	 whether	 this	 constitutes	 real	 moral	judgment.	My	claim,	then,	is	that	the	core	debate	over	animal	morality	does	seem	to	be	concerned	with	 the	 nature	 and	 distribution	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 what	may	 be	 genuine	psychological	natural	kinds,	namely	capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy	and	other	potential	capacities	that	may	produce	altruistic	behaviour,	capacities	to	internalize	and	 enforce	 norms	 of	 conduct	 of	 various	 sorts,	 capacities	 for	 various	 types	 of	normative	 judgment	 or	 evaluation,	 reflective	 normative	 reasoning,	 and	 so	 forth.	There	 may	 also	 be	 groupings	 of	 these	 capacities	 that	 constitute	 genuine	 natural	kinds—for	 instance,	 in	 virtue	 of	 sharing	 a	 common	 evolutionary	 function.	 Clearly,	much	work	has	 to	be	done	 to	understand	 the	nature	of	 the	 cognitive	mechanisms	that	 underlie	 these	 capacities,	 and	 when	 and	 why	 they	 might	 have	 evolved.	However,	 the	 question	 of	 which	 of	 these,	 or	 which	 grouping	 of	 them,	 if	 any,	constitutes	“morality”	or	mere	“proto-morality”	is	not	a	substantive	one;	it	is	merely	
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terminological.	One	may	wish	to	appropriate	the	terms	“morality”,	“moral”,	“proto-moral”,	to	pick	out	some	particular	set	of	these	capacities,	but	there	is	no	reason	to	regard	 any	 such	way	 of	 doing	 so	 as	more	 or	 less	 correct.	 Like	 language,	 the	 pre-theoretical	concept,	morality,	just	isn't	precise	enough	to	give	us	a	principled	reason	to	endorse	one	over	any	of	the	others.		 In	places,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	suggest	a	pragmatic	justification	for	their	broad	definition	of	“morality”:		 	The	 concept	 of	 animal	 morality	 encourages	 a	 unified	 research	 agenda.	 An	exploration	 of	 moral	 behaviour	 in	 animals	 allows	 a	 number	 of	 seemingly	distinct	research	agendas	in	ethology—research	on	animal	emotions,	animal	cognition,	and	diverse	behaviour	patterns	such	as	play,	cooperation,	altruism,	fairness,	and	empathy—to	coalesce	into	a	coherent	whole.	(2009,	p54)			They	also	claim	that	this	shifts	the	focus	to	looking	for	cognitive	similarities	between	humans	 and	 animals	 and	 that	 this	 can	 produce	 unexpected	 and	 important	discoveries.	But,	of	course,	those	that	pursue	cognitive	differences	between	humans	and	 animals	 as	 their	 guideline	 and	 wish	 to	 adopt	 more	 restrictive	 definitions	 of	“morality”	 for	 that	heuristic	purpose	could	say	much	the	same.	 In	any	case,	 surely	what	 really	 matters	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 underlying	 cognitive	 similarities	 and	differences,	 and	 that	 we	 actively	 look	 for	 such	 things,	 not	 the	 terms	 we	 use	 to	describe	 them.	 Whether	 or	 not	 we	 use	 terms	 like	 “morality”	 or	 “proto-morality”	seems	entirely	beside	the	point.27		
5.	 Concluding	remarks	At	this	point,	it	might	be	suggested	that	Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	actually	have	the	right	 idea:	 if	 the	pre-theoretical	 concept	 of	morality	 is	 importantly	 indeterminate,	such	that	it	admits	precisification	in	terms	of	a	variety	of	different	putative	natural																																																									27	It	might,	of	course,	turn	out	that	similar	problems	exist	with	respect	to	other	terms	in	this	debate.	“Empathy”,	in	particular,	has	also	been	the	subject	of	terminological	disagreement	(e.g.,	what	is	real	empathy?	 Is	 emotional	 contagion	 really	 empathy?),	 as	 has	 “social	 norm”	 (e.g.,	 can	 there	 really	 be	social	norms	without	mindreading	and	language?).	If	that	is	the	case,	then	similar	conclusions	should	follow:	what	matters	is	the	nature	of	the	relevant	psychological	capacities	and	associated	behaviours	possessed	by	humans	and	animals,	not	the	terms	used	to	describe	them.	
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kinds,	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	 only	by	 appealing	 to	 some	 substantive	moral	 theory	 that	one	can	have	a	principled	reason	to	pick	out	some	set	of	psychological	capacities	as	constitutive	 of	 real	 or	genuine	morality.	 Hence,	what	 I	 have	 called	 the	 conceptual	approach	to	animal	morality	might	be	seen	as	having	an	advantage	over	the	natural	kind	approach:	we	do	actually	have	to	import	heavy	duty	philosophical	assumptions	about	 the	 nature	 of	moral	 value,	 normativity,	 and	 so	 forth,	 in	 order	 to	 determine	whether	morality	really	does	exist	in	animals—that	question	cannot	be	rendered	as	a	purely	empirical	one,	if	it	is	meant	to	be	more	than	a	matter	of	mere	terminology.	However,	 while	 I	 think	 that	 there	 is	 much	 to	 admire,	 for	 instance,	 in	Rowlands’	(2012)	externalist	consequentialism	and	its	application	to	animals,	given	the	seeming	intractability	of	the	philosophical	debates	over	such	issues	and	the	fact	these	 are	 not	 waters	 in	 which	 they	 originally	 wanted	 to	 tread,	 I	 think	 that	researchers	like	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	would	be	well	advised	to	continue	to	stay	clear	of	the	metaphysics	of	normativity.	Hence,	insofar	as	the	core	debate	over	animal	 morality	 is	 indeed	 meant	 to	 be	 both	 independent	 of	 substantive	philosophical	 theorizing	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 moral	 value,	 and	 a	 debate	 of	 real	substance,	not	mere	terminological	preference,	it	needs	to	be	re-framed—there	isn’t	anything	of	value	to	be	had	debating	whether	“morality”	or	“proto-morality”	exists	in	animals.	As	 the	 discussion	 and	 the	 end	 of	 the	 previous	 section	 indicates,	 my	suggestion	 is	 that	 researchers	 should	 adopt	 a	 more	 fine-grained	 taxonomic	approach,	 focused	 on	 uncovering	 and	 delineating	 the	 particular	 psychological	capacities	 and	mechanisms	 that	 underlie	 the	 kinds	 of	 social	 behaviours	 that	 have	been	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 debate.	 Of	 course,	 in	 this	 respect,	 I	 am	 not	 suggesting	something	 that	 researchers	 haven't	 already	 been	 doing.	 However,	 such	 details	about,	 for	 instance,	 the	 sorts	 of	 other-directed	 emotional	 capacities	 present	 in	various	species	or	the	various	types	of	social	norms	present	in	animal	communities	(and	how	they	might	be	acquired	and	have	evolved	over	time),	have	often	been	lost	behind	headline	claims	about	“morality”.	The	fact	that	research	agendas	have	often	been	driven	by	prior	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	morality	or	moral	behaviour	has	also	meant	that	some	social	cognitive	capacities	have	received	more	attention	than	
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others.	Hence,	what	I	am	suggesting	is	that	these	sorts	of	details	ascend	to	the	fore,	and	that	they	be	separated	from	questions	about	“morality”	or	“proto-morality”.	Finally,	 it	 might	 be	 objected	 that	 one	 important	 reason	 to	 keep	 the	 core	debate	focused	on	whether	morality	exists	in	animals	concerns	the	potential	ethical	ramifications	of	 the	 issue,	 given	 that	 some	 common	arguments	 against	 the	 ethical	considerability	 of	 animals	 and	 in	 defence	 of	 our	 using	 particular	 species	 for	 food,	medical	 research,	 entertainment	 in	 zoos	 and	 circuses,	 and	 so	 forth,	 presume	 that	morality	is	uniquely	human	and	constitutes	an	ethically	relevant	difference	between	humans	and	other	animals.28	Musschenga	(2013),	for	instance,	argues	that	ascribing	morality	 to	 some	 animal	 species	 would	 erase	 an	 important	 potential	 ethical	difference	maker	 between	 them	 and	us,	 and	 should	 lead	 us	 to	 treat	 these	 species	with	more	respect	than	might	otherwise	be	the	case.29	Again,	 however,	 it	 seems	 that	 what	 really	 matters	 when	 it	 comes	 to	determining	what	bearing,	if	any,	the	core	debate	over	animal	morality	might	have	on	questions	about	 the	ethical	 status	of	animals,	 concerns	 the	nature	of	 the	actual	psychological	 similarities	 and	 differences	 between	 humans	 and	 animals,	 not	what	terms	we	use	 to	describe	 them.	For	 instance,	when	philosophers	 try	 to	defend	the	ethical	 superiority	 of	 human	 beings	 by	 saying	 things	 like,	 “Normal	 human	 life	involves	moral	 tasks,	and	that	 is	why	we	are	more	 important	 than	other	beings	 in	nature”	 (Machan,	2002,	p10),	 it	 is	not	 the	use	of	 the	 term	“moral”	 that	 is	 really	of	significance,	but	what	specific	capacity	is	claimed	to	constitute	the	ethical	difference	maker,	exactly	what	this	capacity	is	taken	to	consist	in,	which	species	possess	it,	and	whether	 its	 presence	or	 absence	 can	 really	 support	 particular	 ethical	 conclusions.	Thus,	 although	 the	 terms	 “moral”	 and	 “morality”	 might	 perhaps	 have	 more																																																									28	For	instance,	one	sometimes	hears	it	said	that	rights	can	only	be	extended	to	members	of	a	moral	community,	or	that	only	creatures	that	are	themselves	capable	of	participating	in	moral	deliberation	can	have	direct	ethical	status.		29	As	noted	earlier,	Rowlands	also	argues	that	attributing	morality	to	particular	species	should	lead	us	to	treat	them	with	greater	respect.	However,	his	argument	is	based	not	so	much	on	the	erosion	of	a	 putative	 psychological	 difference	 between	 them	 and	 us,	 but	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 these	 animals	 are	capable	(like	some	human	beings)	of	being	motivated	by	the	good-making	features	of	an	action	and	of	doing	good.	Again,	 this	 requires	not	 just	an	account	of	 the	psychological	 states	and	capacities	of	these	animals,	but	also	an	account	of	their	metaphysical	relationship	to	moral	properties.	
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rhetorical	 effect	 in	 arguments	 for	 or	 against	 particular	 human	 practices	 towards	animals,	 re-framing	 the	 core	 debate	 over	 animal	 morality	 in	 the	 way	 that	 I	 have	suggested	 would	 not,	 I	 claim,	 deprive	 it	 of	 its	 potential	 ethical	 import.	 In	 fact,	 it	would	help	to	sharpen	such	discussions.		
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